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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the dissertation of Abdullah Alkadi for the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Urban Studies presented May 6, 1996. 
Title: Hedonic Analysis of Housing Prices near the Portland Urban 
Growth Boundary, 1978-1990. 
The cornerstones of Oregon's 1973 Senate Bill 100 are the 
preservation of farm, forest, and other resource lands and the 
containment of urban development within urban growth boundaries 
(UGB). The UGB is a boundary around each incorporated city 
containing enough land to meet projected needs until the year 2000. 
The Land Conservation and Development Commission 
(LCDC), charged with adopting and implementing state planning 
policy, sought to keep UGBs small enough to contain urban sprawl. 
To avoid the potential effects of land price inflation, LCOC allowed 
UGBs to include more land supply than the forecasted demand. The 
Portland-Metropolitan region was allowed to have a 15.3-percent 
surplus. 
Policy makers are unsure what effect UGBs have on housing 
costs. The common belief is that by restricting the amount of land 
available for residential construction the market drives prices up. 
Contrasting opinions suggest that by substituting low-density with 
high-density development, per-unit construction costs are lower, thus 
reducing the costs of owning a hom.e_. -------··. 
Efforts to dispel some of the mystery about the relationship 
between UGBs and housing prices are needed. The objective of this 
research is to provide empirical evidence of the relationship between 
the Portland-Metropolitan area's UGB and housing prices. The study 
uses a hedonic model to conduct a time-series analysis for the years 
1978 to 1990 for Washington County. 
This study found no relationship between housing price and 
the imposition of the UGB. In fact, the rate of increase in price for 
single-family housing after UGB implementation was found to be 
much less than before. Proximity as measured by distance of sale to 
the UGB was the only variable that was associated with a higher rate 
of increase in housing prices. 
All of these results, with the exception of those related to 
proximity, were unexpected but may be explained by several factors: 
imposition of the Metropolitan Housing Rule in 1981, a severe 
recession during the 1980s, and excess land supply. These influences 
do not support a conclusion that UGBs lead to an increase in housing 
prices, at least prior to 1990, when the UGB did not constrain the 
supply of land. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
The United States post-World War II population growth has 
significantly shifted away from the central cities, with the automobile, 
federal highway programs, and federal housing policies lessening the 
individual's reliance on the central city. The rate of population 
growth in the suburbs, compared to population growth in the central 
cities, has been extraordinary. Populations in the 1950s and 1960s in 
the suburbs surrounding the nation's largest metropolitan areas grew 
by 53.9 percent while the central cities added only 1.5 percent to their 
population. Between 1960 and 1985, the population increase in the 
United States was estimated to be 73 million persons with almost 80 
percent of this growth (58 million persons) estimated to live in 
suburban communities. Furthermore, the total suburban population 
rose from 41 million in 1950 to 115 million in 1990, an increase of 181 
percent compared with a 65 percent increase in total population 
(Downs 1994). 
The substantial increase in the areas surrounding central cities 
has resulted in a sprawling pattern of urban development with huge 
amounts of rural/farm land being transformed to accommodate this 
urban expansion. Rural landscapes, which once were dominated by 
agricultural uses, have been converted into housing, shopping 
centers, roads, industrial facilities and office spaces. Urban sprawl has 
consumed land at a much faster rate than the population (Toulan 
1965), an example being that during the l26_Qs, totaLurban population 
increased by 21 percent while the consumption of land for urban uses 
increased by 36 percent (Nelson 1984). 
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The state of Oregon has not been immune to this migration 
from urban areas to the rural environs. The state has been a popular 
destination for people from other states, which has exacerbated urban 
sprawl and resulted in the loss of open space. In the 1960s, the ability 
of Oregon's fiscal base and environment to manage the sprawling 
development started to become a growing concern among lawmakers, 
with the provision of sewer, water and other necessary infrastructure 
services to the low-density suburban developments generating 
additional costs that the state's natives were reluctant to pay. The 
result was a strained relationship between long-time residents and 
new arrivals, who received much of the blame for the perceived ills of 
rapid urban development. This anti-growth sentiment was voiced by 
then-Governor Tom McCall and his not-so subtle greetings at the 
California border pleading for visitors to "enjoy your visit, but don't 
stay." 
Environmental concerns focused on the diminishing amount 
of forest and agricultural land, the backbone of the state's economy, 
with the greatest loss occurring in the fertile Willamette Valley, which 
stretches south from Portland for approximately 100 miles. The 
Willamette Valley accounts for only a small percentage of the state's 
land area, yet it is home to nearly 75 percent of the state's population 
(Howe 1993). There was a widespread fear that the tide of urban 
development would eventually wash over the Willamette Valley if 
the state did not take strong measures to guide, direct, and control the 
quality of this growth (DeGrave 1984). 
Despite the anti-growth atmosphere in the state, its legislators 
acknowledged the reality of thP growth and were prepared to confront 
the issue with the result that in 1969, the Oregon legislature passed 
Senate Bill 10, an initiative which required all cities and counties to 
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adopt and apply comprehensive planning and zoning ordinances 
addressing nine statewide goals, including growth management 
(Toulan 1994; Knaap & Nelson 1992 ). The plans were to be reviewed 
and approved by the Governor. This first attempt at legislatively 
controlling development failed, as there was insufficient staff to push 
local governments and no penalties for noncompliance (Nelson 1992). 
In 1973 the legislature tried again, passing Senate Bill 100. The 
cornerstones of this initiative were the preservation of farm, forest, 
and other open space or environmentally sensitive land and the 
containment of urban development within urban growth boundaries 
(Nelson 1992). The urban growth boundary (UGB) was to be 
established around each city or urbanized area, containing enough 
land to meet projected development needs until the year 2000. All 
land in the state was to be either inside UGBs or classified for 
exclusive resource uses. With some exceptions, for example large 
acreage lots, residential development outside UGBs was to be stopped. 
Land within the boundary, even undeveloped and agricultural land, 
was available for conversion into urban use. 
Determining how much land was to be included within UGBs 
was often controversial. Localities fought to include enough land in 
order to avoid land price inflation. The commission that was created 
with Senate Bill 100, the Land Conservation and Development 
Commission (LCDC), was charged with adopting and implementing 
state planning policy and sought to keep UGBs small enough to 
contain urban sprawl (Knaap & Nelson 1992). However, to avoid the 
potential effects of land price inflation, the LCDC made sure that UGBs 
contained more land than forecasted for the year 2000; for example, 
the Portland metropolitan region was allowed to have a 15.3 percent 
land surplus (Nelson 1994). 
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Even if UGBs contain more than enough land for future 
development, policy makers are unsure what effect these boundaries 
have on housing costs. The common belief is that by restricting the 
amount of land available for residential construction the market 
would drive prices up. Contrasting opinions suggest that by 
substituting low-density development with high density, costs 
associated with the provision of public services would be reduced, 
thus lowering the cost of owning a horne (Abbott, Howe, Adler 1994). 
Efforts to dispel some of the mystery about the relationship 
between UGBs and housing prices are needed. The objective of this 
research is to conduct a hedonic analysis of detached single family 
housing prices near the Portland metropolitan area's UGB. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to examine changes in 
the detached single-housing prices that occurred shortly after the 
implementation of the Portland metropolitan area's UGB. There are 
many factors that can influence the housing market. This study 
attempts to examine the relationship of UGBs and housing price, 
while holding other important variables affecting price constant. 
These other variables include factors such as interest rates, 
accessibility, housing site and structure, and neighborhood 
characteristics. To examine the changes in the detached single 
housing prices, this research utilizes hedonic analysis, which simply 
measures a relationship between housing unit attributes and market 
prices. 
The examination of the changes in the detached single-housing 
prices that are concurrent with UGBs has several implications for 
policy makers. A better understanding of the behavior of the housing 
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market concurrent with UGBs would help planners and public 
officials in analyzing the desirability of adopting such a program for a 
particular community. In addition, this research should help policy 
makers develop an economic rationale for the need for extending 
UGBs to other areas designated as non-urban. Finally, the study 
should enrich the growth management literature as it will dispel 
some of the ambiguities about changes in the market for single-family 
houses associated with UGBs. 
This study is focusing only on the market for the detached 
single-family horne for two main reasons. First, the rental market is 
different from the ownership market. Second, UGBs are imposed to 
control urban sprawl and low densities, which are fueled by single-
family housing. 
The Portland metropolitan area's UGB was implemented in 
October 1980. As a result this study examines the changes in the 
detached single-family housing market for a few years before (back to 
January 1978) and a few years after (up to 1990, the midpoint of the 
UGB's designated period). 
The Portland area was chosen because it is one of the fastest 
growing areas in the U.S., and the UGB has been in place long enough 
for any changes in the housing market to become apparent. However, 
the Portland area is too large an area to be examined; therefore, 
Washington County was chosen from the Portland area. This 
research is focusing on Washington County because it is the fastest 
growing of the three counties, Multnomah, Clackamas, and 
Washington. In addition, the data for Washington County is 
cornpu terized and w'-"--""e'"'ll'--'e.__.s~t=ab=l._..is___.hc"e.._.d.._.. ______ _ 
The Portland area in general and Washington County in 
particular have a history of rapid growth in population and 
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employment during the last few decades. A brief historica.l 
background about some trends should help the reader to understand 
the forces behind the dynamics of the housing market. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this section is to give a brief discussion about 
population, employment, and housing trends for Washington County 
and the Portland metropolitan area. Portland is, comparatively 
speaking, a young city. Portland was incorporated only 150 years ago. 
In 1860 the population did not exceed 2,844 people. The increase in 
railroad connections, streetcar lines, paved roads and electric lights, 
made the area start to grow significantly after the turn of the century. 
As a result of World War II, the metropolitan area population grew 
from about 500,000 in 1940 to over 660,000 in 1944 (Abbott 1983; 
Friedman 1993). 
In 1950, the Portland region was horne to 620,000 people. ThE.~ 
area kept increasing at a rapid pace to 822,000 in 1960 and 1,007,130 in 
1970. This increase was fueled by the immigration of many 
Californians who moved north to escape smog, traffic, crowds, 
earthquakes, crime, the drought, and economic woes. 
After 1970 the region's population grew at an even faster rate .. 
As shown in Figure 1, from 1970 to 1990 the population of th~~ 
Portland metropolitan area increased from 1,007,130 to 1,495,548-· 
almost 50 percent. Washington County's population increased from 
157,920 to 311,554- almost 98 percent. 
This increase in population :-va~sso_~l~t_ed wi_th a growth in th(t 
regional economy. As shown in Figure 2, the total employment of th(t 
Portland metropolitan area increased from 518,200 in 1979 to 636,900 
in 1990-an increase of over 22 percent. However, employment i fl. 
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Washington County had a greater expansion. The total employment 
went from 33,324 in 1960 to 172,008 in 1990- an increase of 416 
percent. 
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Figure 1. Population Trends for the Portland Metropolitan 
Area and Washington County for the Period 1970-1990. Source: 
RMLS 1990. 
The region's economy was hit by a very severe recession in 
early 1980s, but it rapidly regained its strength as employment went up 
by 28,800 (5.2 percent) in 1988, 31,200 (5.4 percent) in 1989, and 22,500 
(3.71 percent) in 1990. 
The median family income for the Portland area increased 
throughout the 1960-1990 period. The median family income for 
Washington County was even higher than in the metro area. The 
difference between the two adjacent areas peaked in 1990, when 
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Washington County enjoyed a median income in the $40,000-$45,000 
range versus a metropolitan area median of just over $30,000. 
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Figure 2. Employment Trends for Portland Metropolitan Area 
for the Period 1979-1990. Source: RMLS 1991 
Growth in population and economic prosperity led to a strong 
regional housing market and a concomitant rise in housing prices. 
Single-family housing permits for the four-county area (Multnomah, 
Washington, Clackamas, and Clark County) went up from 5,756 in 
1980 to 8,315 in 1990- an increase of 45 percent. As shown in Figure 
3, the average housing value in 1979 was $65,500 for the metropolitan 
area, while the median sales price was $59,900. These figures went up 
to $96,000 for the average housing value in 1990, while the median 
sales price was $79,700. The same figure shows a decline in the 
average housing values during 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985. This decline 
9 
was a natural reflection of the recession in the economy that took 
place in early 1980s. 
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Figure 3. Single-Family Home Prices for the Portland 
Metropolitan Area, 1979-1990. Source: RMLS 1990. 
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters. Chapter I, the 
introduction, discusses the general scope of the problem, the study 
objective, the historical background of the area of study, and the study 
outline. Chapter II gives a brief review of related literature in two 
sections. 
The first sectiuiL LOH::;bt:; ·of i:wo·--patts which review the 
dynamics of the housing market. Part one spells out most of the 
factors that affect the supply-demand framework. Part two discusses 
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land use and housing price theories. This second part deals mainly 
with factors that affect housing prices from a spatial point of view. 
The second secti011 reviews empirical studies that address 
variables which affect housing prices. This section focuses mostly on 
studies dealing with housing prices and land use controls. Sections 
one and two pave the way for this research to develop a model that -· 
could be used to test the relationship between UGBs and housing 
prices. 
Chapter II concludes with a brief summary of empirical studies 
about urban growth controls and housing prices. Chapter III discusses 
the methodology used for this research in terms of the necessary 
approaches to problem examination and research design. 
Chapter IV presents the empirical analysis of the research 
questions. In particular, it analyses the data of the study, it discusses 
the research findings, and then it gives a brief summary of the main 
analysis in this chapter. Chapter V presents the major research 
findings and concludes with policy implications and some suggestions 
for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
11 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a theoretical 
perspective on the relationship between land use controls and 
housing prices. There have been various studies of housing prices 
and land use controls. In order to establish the connection between 
housing prices and UGBs, it is necessary to explore the findings of 
these studies to identify relevant variables. 
The exploration is in two sections with the first providing a 
theoretical foundation of the housing market by examining the 
supply-demand framework and then land use and housing price 
theories. The second section analyzes the empirical studies which 
integrate land use controls and housing prices. This is followed with a 
conclusion. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE HOUSING MARKET 
The housing market is fairly complex with numerous variables 
playing significant roles in determining its behavior. Many 
participants contribute to the housing market, including land 
developers, builders, Realtors, financial institutions, and local 
governments; these participants provide the inputs necessary for 
housing development (Knaap and Nelson 1992). Another part of the 
housing market equation is housing characteristics, including the 
quality of the dwelling itself, the size of the dwelling, and site 
characteristics (Kain and Quigley 1970). Each single house and the lot 
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on which it is located is unique in terms of size, location, topography, 
subsoil conditions, public regulations, supporting services, ownership, 
and future utility. Housing prices vary with these attributes and with 
the conditions of sale (Black and Hoben 1985). 
Given this complexity, this research utilizes economic theories, 
such as the supply-demand framework and the bid-rent function, in 
determining the factors that affect the housing market. Recognizing 
the multiplicity of participants in the housing market, the following 
discussion analyzes the housing market from two perspectives. The 
first employs the supply-demand framework and the second a land 
use approach. 
1. Housing Prices from the Supply-Demand Framework 
Supply-demand functions determine the basis for the housing 
market with the supply function being represented by the standing 
stock in the housing market, while the demand function is 
represented by the consumers' desire and ability to have a certain type 
of housing. This interaction of supply and demand factors determines 
housing prices (Black and Hoben 1985; Manchester 1987). However, 
there are factors that influence each side of the supply-demand 
framework and the following is an analysis of the supply-demand 
framework and the variables that could influence each side. 
a. Supply-Side Factors 
On the supply side, the cost of housing inputs (land, labor, 
capital, and materials) could affect the quantity supplied. Regulatory 
restrictions, restrictjo~g_n ___ service facilities (infrastructure), natural 
restrictions, environmental restrictions, ownership characteristics and 
tax policy could exacerbate the cost of housing inputs (Black and 
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Hoben 1985; Deakin 1991). In fact, land use controls influence the 
housing market primarily through the market for land, an example 
being that a parcel of laitd cannot be used for housing construction 
until the parcel has been zoned by local governments for residential 
use (Landis 1986; Niebanck 1991; Lowry and Ferguson 1992; Knaap and 
Nelson 1992; Downs 1994). 
In some cases, local governments zone enough land for 
residential use, but restrict the supply of residential units by placing an 
annual cap on housing permits. This type of limitation on the 
residential supply causes housing prices to rise. Schwartz, Hansen, 
and Green (1984) conducted a study on Petaluma, California, after it 
placed an annual cap on building permits of a maximum of 500 
permits per year, well below recent and expected demand. Their study 
found that Petaluma's housing prices were 9 percent higher than 
similar units in nearby Santa Rosa, California, where a limitation on 
housing supply was not implemented. Katz and Rosen (1987) also 
analyzed data froE1 Bay Area communities and found that existing 
housing in communities that placed a cap on building permits were 17 
to 38 percent higher in value than those communities without such 
controls. 
Besides policies aimed directly at the supply of housing, cities 
can reduce supply indirectly by acquiring development rights, an 
example being the acquisition of land for greenbelt or open space 
easements which could then be used to limit the amount of land 
available for development (Correll, Lillydahl, and Singell 1978). 
Although many methods have been used for several decades to 
constrain land supply, greenbelts have been known and used for 
centuries and could be the first tool in history to have been used to 
constrain developable land. Toulan (1965) analyzed the usage of 
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greenbelts as barriers to limit land available for development and 
demonstrated that the usage of greenbelts went back to the sixteenth 
century when Sir Thomas l\1oore developed his famous utopian 
scheme. Less than a century later, Elizabeth I of England proclaimed 
the formation of a greenbelt around the city of London. In 1958 the 
city of Ottawa in Canada also used greenbelts for limiting the amount 
of land available for development. 
Many local governments use UGBs and urban growth service 
boundaries to delay conversion of rural land to urban usage (Bruckner 
1990; Easley 1992), and this delay reduces the land supplied for 
development. Whether the constraint on land supply is stringent or 
not depends on the amount of supplied developable land in relation 
to targeted time. Time is the key figure in UGB programs: the intent 
of traditional land use regulations is to specify what, where, and how 
one can improve land, while UGBs specify when one can improve 
land (Knaap 1982). However, if local governments restrict 
developable land for residential uses (which will be represented by an 
inward curve, showing that lower supplies are provided at all prices) 
the price of land will increase, all things being equal, and in turn this 
will affect the price of housing (Fischel 1990). 
The empirical work by Segal and Srinivasan (1985) analyzed 
housing prices among fifty metropolitan areas where some of these 
metropolitan areas withdrew 20 percent of their suburban developable 
land. Their study found that areas with land supply constraint had at 
least 6 percent greater inflation in housing prices than areas that had 
not. In fact, Landis (1986) argues that a 10-percent reduction in the 
supply of developable land available for new home construction 
ultimately may increase the price of new housing by 20 or even 30 
percent. 
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It follows that if land supply is constrained by any means in the 
face of constant demand (with the assumption that other factors are 
held constant), the price vf land will rise and in turn housing prices 
will escalate. 
b. Demand Side Factors 
On the demand side, population growth and other 
demographic changes, increasing incomes, decentralization of 
population, and interest rates are major factors thought to generate 
demand for more housing (Beaton 1982; Black and Hoben 1985; 
Manchester 1986; Dowall 1986; Smith 1989; Fischel 1990; Sullivan 1990; 
Deakin 1991; Lowry and Ferguson 1992; Malpezzi and Ball 1992; and 
Knaap and Nelson 1992). Although Beaton {1982) believes that 
demand variables are the driving force in housing markets, he argues 
that these variables are national or at least regional factors which tend 
to transcend a given state and most certainly a given city. 
One of the most influential variables on the demand side is 
interest rate. Many consumers are highly reactive to interest rate 
changes. Snyder and Stegman (1986) argue that interest rates have 
historically dominated the demand for more housing. The validity of 
this argument can be supported by Manchester's 1986 study, in which 
he tested the housing market of 42 metropolitan areas for the period 
between 1971 and 1978 and found that a one percentage point rise in 
the interest rate would cause a significant drop in the quantity of 
housing demanded. Studies by Singell and Lillydahl {1990), Segal and 
Srinivasan {1985), and Pollakowski and Wachter {1990) also tested the 
effect of interest rates and found tb(lt they _ _h~_y~ a ~gnificant negative 
consequence on housing value, which in turn affects the quantity 
demanded. 
-------------
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Population increase or decreq.se which normally affects the 
number of households plays a significant role in the demand 
function, with an increa~e in popuh1tion creatimg more demand for 
housing and in turn on land consumption. This association between 
population increase and land consumption has been recognized in the 
literature for some time (George, 1879). This vvas tested by several 
empirical studies, such as Segal and ~)rinivasan (1985), Beaton (1982), 
and Black and Hoben (1985), all of whom inclnded the population 
variable in their regression equations to control :for housing demand. 
Segal and Srinivasan (1985) found that after controlling for other 
demand and supply factors, population changes had a significant 
influence on housing demand. SiJ.Tiilarly, Beaton (1982) found a 
significant relationship between the quantity of housing demanded 
and population growth. He increase,d the explanatory power of his 
model by adding demand data from national sources and national 
variables including income, interest ri:ltes and national housing prices. 
He concluded that these demand variq.bles are the force that drives the 
housing market and are factors which tend to transcend a given state 
and most certainly a given city. In fact, Deakin (11991) criticized many 
researchers for failing to account for price increases due to demand 
shifts that are stimulated by population growth and other factors such 
as job and income growth. 
Increase in income could also cc~use an upward shift in housing 
demand and Segal and Srinivasan (1985), Fischel (1991), Black and 
Hoben (1985), Dubin (1990) and Downs (1994) explain that an increase 
in income exacerbates the demand for housing! This is consistent 
with the empirical .works_QiMuth (1960) and_Lee. (1268), whose studies 
demonstrate that income is positively associated with housing 
demand. However, Smith (1989) believes that alh increase in income 
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could also affect the supply side if higher wages result in an increase in 
the price of housing. He argues that "if income in a city rises 
primarily because of higlter wages, and if it is difficult to substitute 
away from labor in the construction of housing, then the cost function 
would shift upward as income increases" (1989, p. 17). 
Land use controls could also stimulate the demand for housing. 
Fischel (1989), Bruckner {1990), Sullivan {1990) and Knaap and Nelson 
(1992) argue that land use controls improve the quality of the 
residential environment, increasing the relative attractiveness of the 
city, causing migration that pushes up the price of both housing and 
land. As the demand for housing increases (an outward shift of the 
demand curve, showing that higher demand exists at all prices), the 
demand for land increases. This increase in the demand for land 
increases the price of land and hence increases the price of housing. 
In short, housing prices could be influenced by factors that affect 
the supply function, demand function, or both functions 
simultaneously. The interaction between the supply and demand 
function is illustrated in Figure 4. After drawing the connection 
between the supply-demand framework and housing prices, the 
following section explains the connection between land use and 
housing prices. 
2. Land Use and Housing Price Theories 
The relationship between land use and housing prices has long 
been recognized within the theoretical framework for explaining the 
distribution of land use and housing prices in urban areas, as derived 
from the work of William Alonso (1964) which followed that of David 
Ricardo and Von Thunen. 
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Ricardo, Von Thunen, and AlonsQ tried to construct theories of 
land use and land value. Von Thune~1 and Ricardo limited their 
analyses to agricultural :iand, while A~onsol went beyond that and 
included all types of urban uses as well. This!section utilizes the work 
of those theorists as well as the work pf other scholars in order to 
provide a theoretical foundation for the derivation of housing prices. 
Many studies have identified factors thp.t play a role in the housing 
market. Miller (1982) discusses comprehensive factors which 
influence residential property values. lie argues that site, quality and 
quantity, location or environment, locational externalities, and 
transaction costs are factors which affect the cost of a house. 
Kain and Quigley (1970) developed a comprehensive study 
regarding quality issues which suggested that factors such as 
neighborhood characteristics, quality o( public schools, crime rates, 
ethnic composition, and proximity to nonresidential usage have an 
important effect on housing values. Thepe factors are discussed in the 
following section under four main q1tegories: accessibility factors, 
public services factors, structure and site fadors, and neighborhood 
factors. 
a. Accessibility Factors 
One of the first comprehensive analiyses of land value was 
developed in the beginning of the nineteenth century by David 
Ricardo, who attributed the price of Ian<~ to !the quality of soil and its 
proximity to the market square (Sullivan ! 1990). "i'he concept of 
proximity to the market square was then extensively developed by 
Von Thunen to explain why land rents increase with the accessibility 
of land (Lloyd and Dicken 1977; Sulliv~n 1990). In Van Thunen's 
model, one of the major factors that 1 affect land value is 
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transportation; he theorizes that transportation cost is dilrectly 
proportional to the distance between land and the market 
(Cadwallader 1985; Sull~van 1990). Von Thunen's model' was 
followed that of William Alonso (1964) who ~~mphasizes the 
locational pattern of the different land uses based on the assumption 
of the ability of a type of land use to outbid another type. This theory 
indicates that retailing use outbids residential m;e in terms of 
proximity to the central business district (CBD) (Cadwallader 1985). As 
the distance increases residential use becomes more profitable: than 
retailing use. 
Alonso's model, like Van Thunen's, theorizes that 
transportation cost is linearally related to distm;1ce, but :more 
specifically that transportation costs increase with increasing distance 
from the city center. In this way the CBD is the most accessible 
location in the city and accessibility decreases as one moves away 1 from 
that location. This indicates that when transportat\on costs att the 
CBD are zero, then land value is at its highest price. Thus a 
movement of a land use away from the CBD implies q. substitution of 
transportation costs for more space; as a result, housing firms ~rould 
respond to lower land prices by using more land per 'j.mit of housing 
(Sullivan 1990). Wingo's work supports this substitutipn, as he argues 
that a consumer would spend a fixed amount on the combinati0n of 
transportation and housing. Further, Meyer, Kain, a~1d Wohl ~1965) 
note that in urban areas, transportation and housing ~xpenditures are 
substitutable to varying degrees. 
Earlier works have focused on transportation cqsts as the main 
factor influencing 11nd a.nQ.J]ousi_ng __ p_rjce._s_,__]'his_js attributed to the 
nature of the dominant urban form (monocentric or core-dominated 
city) before the development of the automobile and tbe truck in the 
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early part of the 20th century. However, the development of the 
automobile, increases in real personal income, urban population 
increases, changes in ~tousehold composition, and decline in 
transportation costs have changed most large metropolitan areas 
(Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez 1981), with the result that they have 
become multicentric with suburban subcenters and multi-nuclei 
centers of activities, such as shopping centers, that complement and 
compete with the central core area (Sullivan 1990). These subcenters 
and multi-nuclei centers have added more peaks to the bid-rent 
gradient of the city. 
Many researchers have tried to conduct empirical studies to test 
the effect of multi-nuclei centers such as employment and shopping 
centers on housing prices. The conducted research has used both time 
and distance as proximity measures, while most studies have used 
distance alone, to measure proximity to employment and shopping 
centers (Miller 1982). Waldo (1974) found that proximity to 
employment centers reduces the opportunity cost of commuting time 
and this in turn is capitalized in housing prices. The empirical work 
of Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) suggests that proximity to 
employment centers has affected Boston's housing prices positively. 
Similarly, Brookshire et al. (1982) tested property values in the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area, and Gamble and Downing (1982) tested 
property values in the Northeastern United States and found a 
positive shift in housing prices due to time savings because of the 
proximity to major employment centers. 
In fact, time savings in commuting may not be due only to 
proximity to employment_~_~I}ters but also to proximity to major roads, 
such as freeways, which reduces commuting time. Wingo argues that 
a new freeway would make areas in close proximity more desirable for 
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development than they previously were. Existing housing along the 
route would rise in value as market forces restore equilibrium with 
undeveloped land along the route, which would become more 
economically attractive for development. Hence, when a new road 
link increases the accessibility of an area, particularly when measured 
in commuting time, it will significantly influence the behavior of 
developers and of the consumers whom they ultimately serve (Peiser 
1989; Kelly 1992). This can be supported by the empirical work of 
Johnson and Ragas {1987), whose study demonstrates that major street 
corridors shift the dominant land value location away from a 
generally recognized central place. 
Another factor which could affect the bid-rent gradient is 
accessibility to schools, parks, and lakes; proximity to these amenities 
has been shown to affect housing prices positively (Palmquist 1980; 
Miller 1982). This is demonstrated in the empirical work of Li and 
Brown {1980), who found that houses near some amenities, such as 
schools and recreation areas, are higher in prices than houses that are 
farther away. In addition, Johnson and Lea (1982) found that the 
closer a home is located to an elementary school, the greater its value. 
Brown and Pollakowski (1976) found that the prices of Seattle's single-
family dwellings are negatively correlated with proximity to the 
waterfront. This demonstrates that proximity to the waterfront adds 
more value to the house. Proximity to swimming pools and parks 
could also add more value to a house, and the empirical work of 
Gamble and Downing (1982) demonstrates that housing prices fall as 
the distance to swimming pool areas increases. 
It has been discussed earlier that many communities tried to 
use greenbelts to limit developable land as well as to protect open 
spaces. However, home buyers consider greenbelts as amenities and 
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because of this, the value of proximity to these open spaces is 
capitalized in housing prices. Correll et al. (1978) conducted a study to 
test the effect of Boulder, Colorado's greenbelt on residential property 
values. Their study included all single-family residential properties 
which sold in 1975 and which were located within 3,200 feet of the 
greenbelt. Their regression, after controlling for other factors, 
demonstrated that houses close to the greenbelt captured higher 
prices. In fact, the price of a house declined by $10.20 for every single 
foot away from the greenbelt. 
It is therefore not surprising to see an incremental increase in 
the prices of houses close to the Boulder greenbelt. What is surprising 
is to see an increase in land prices close to Salem, Oregon's UGB, even 
though it was designed only for 20 years. Nelson (1984) found that 
urban land values closer to Salem's UGB are capturing higher prices 
than those farther away from it. Like Correll et al. (1978), he attributes 
his findings to the valuation of proximity to open space, which is on 
the buffer of Salem's UGB, where urban residents can enjoy the 
benefits of rural scenery, open space, environmental quality and other 
rural amenities. 
b. Public Service Factors 
Public services are the second major factor which contribute to 
housing prices. Almost forty years ago, Charles Tiebout (1956) 
recognized that households consider differences in public services as 
factors in choosing where to live. Several studies after Tiebout's 
article have confirmed that the price of housing is influenced by the 
quality of local public services (Jud_jl._IJ._d_aenn.eJt 1986). Sullivan (1990) 
argues that the market price of housing depends on the characteristics 
of the dwelling and the site and that among the relevant site 
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characteristics is the quality of public services. In fact, many 
I 
homebuyers pay for better public services ihdirectly through higher 
housing prices. 
The importance of public services has stimulated many scholars 
to test empirically their effect on housing prices. Oates {1969) tested 
the relationship between housing value and school expenditures and 
found that communities with higher school expenditures witness 
higher housing prices. In other words, differi~nces in expenditures are 
capitalized into housing prices. Kain and Qluigley {1970) developed a 
list of variables in order to measure the valui~ of housing quality, and 
they hypothesized that school quality is pbsitively correlated with 
housing prices. Even though their study did not find this significant, 
they argued that better schools attract higher income' homeowners 
who spend more on housing maintenance; tlltis expenditure is in turn 
capitalized in housing prices. 1 
Most studies that deal with school quality and housing prices 
one or more measurements to measure scH1ool quality. Dubin and 
Sung (1990) use two measures in order to isblate the eHect of school 
quality on housing prices. The first measur~~ is an input variable of 
the average teacher's experience in the local ~~lementary schools, while 
the second measure is an output variable of the average 1third and fifth 
grade reading and math achievement test ~;cores in the same local 
elementary schools. Although Li and Browh (1980) us'e these input 
and output variables, they also use expenditt1tre per pupil as an input 
variable and standard test scores for fourth 1 grade pupils as output 
variable. Oates {1969) use expenditure per pupil as thEt measure for 
school quality while Kain aml__Quigle.~ _ __(l27.D) use schools' 
achievement as the measure for schools' qt!tality, although they did 
not give further details of how they measure~:i the achievement. 
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Although the quality of schools is very important to many 
people, especially single family owners, the quality of other public 
services, such as parks, police, and fire protection, is important too. 
Manchester (1987) tried to test the effect of public services on housing 
prices by using expenditure per capita to measure the quality of the 
services. He found that the effect of public service expenditure per 
capita is significant. 
Many researchers have used both input and output measures as 
indicators for public service quality; however, Dubin and Sung (1990) 
argue that input measures may be deficient for two reasons. First, due 
to economies of scale and bureaucratic inefficiency, expenditures may 
not be well correlated with service quality. Second, such researchers 
usually use data based on small municipalities in a large metropolitan 
area, which requires that the municipality and neighborhood 
boundaries coincide. On the contrary, output measures allow the 
researcher to measure service quality at the neighborhood level. 
In addition to the quality of schools and other public services, 
property taxes play a role in affecting housing prices; several studies 
have demonstrated the effect of property tax capitalization on housing 
prices. For example, if two communities have the same level of 
public services, but one community has higher taxes, the price of 
housing will be higher in the low-tax community (Sullivan 1990). 
This is supported by the empirical work of Oates (1969), who found 
that communities with relatively low tax rates had higher housing 
prices and by Knaap (1981), who found that the effect of tax on housing 
prices is highly significant. His study about the effect of the Portland 
metropolitan area's UGB on land values demonstrates that high land 
values in Clackamas County, Oregon, are correlated with low taxes. 
However, Hushak (1975) emphasizes that only with tax rates that vary 
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widely across many jurisdictions can one expect to estimate significant 
tax effects on housing prices. The lack of such variability could be the 
reason behind Knaap's 1~81 study, in which he found that taxes had 
no effect on land values in Washington County, Oregon. 
c. Structure and Site Factors 
Structure and site factors are major contributors to housing 
prices. Structure and site factors, such as lot size, interior square 
footage, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, condition, and 
amenities, affect housing prices positively or negatively. Harrison and 
Rubinfeld (1978), Singell and Lillydahl (1990), Lafferty (1984), 
Brookshire et al. (1982), Hughes and Sirmans (1992), Brown and 
Pollakowski (1977), Kain and Quigley (1970), Gamble and Downing 
(1982), Palmquist (1980), Nelson, Genereux and Genereux (1992), 
Johnson and Lea (1982), and Dubin (1992) have all done studies which 
include variables that affect housing prices. All of these studies have 
considered housing characteristics such as size of the lot, age of the 
house, number of bedrooms, area of the interior living area, and the 
number of bathrooms. 
These studies, except for that of Dubin (1992), found that the 
number of stories was significant; all found that garages and fireplaces 
also had a positive effect on housing prices. Other researchers did not 
include these variables because most houses have them and therefore 
they would not be expected to account for a significant variance in 
housing prices. In fact, Alkadi and Strathman (1994) included the 
number of stories as a variable in their regression model testing for 
effects on housing prices, but whenever tbe__<lrea of the interior space 
was controlled for, the effect of the number of stories lost its 
significance. This demonstrates the high collinearity between the area 
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of the interior space and the number of stories. Gamble and Downing 
(1992), Dubin (1992), and Johnson and Lea (1982) included the presence 
of a basement as a variaule, and this was found to have a positive 
effect on housing prices. However, availability of basements is highly 
correlated with house age, as most houses with basements are old 
ones. So it is most likely to see the availability of a basement as 
having a negative effect on housing prices. 
d. Neighborhood Factors 
Accessibility, the availability of public services, and structure 
and site factors are not the only attributes to affect housing prices. To 
some consumers, neighborhood quality is a major, if not the most 
important, attribute; therefore, it is essential that this research looks 
for those factors or variables that affect neighborhood quality. 
Neighborhood factors include household income, education level, 
densities, racial composition, air and water quality, and crime rates. 
Many home buyers pay higher prices for housing located in 
communities with lower crime rates. The empirical studies by Dubin 
and Sung (1990) and Kain and Quigley (1970) included crime rate 
variables to test for neighborhood quality. Kain and Quigley's 1970 
study did not give any details regarding crime rate measurement 
while Dubin and Sung's 1990 study mentioned that the crime rate was 
obtained by summing the rate of murder, rape, robbery, burglary, and 
aggravated assault for each crime-reporting area. The crime-reporting 
area is the smallest geographical unit for which crime statistics are 
available. The crime rate represents output measures of a very 
important public service, police protection. This variable is a better 
measure of neighborhood quality than per capita expenditures because 
neighborhood safety is of higher interest to the household. 
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Another neighborhood factor that could affect housing prices is 
the level of income of the neighbors. In fact, the level of income 
could be associated with Gime rate. Dubin and Sung (1990) argue that 
people with poor and low incomes might be inferior neighbors and be 
considered unsafe and hence undesirable. The empirical work of 
Knaap {1982, 1985) demonstrates that level of income is positively 
correlated with land values in Washington County, Oregon. 
The educational level of a neighborhood's residents could play 
a role in affecting its housing prices. More highly educated 
individuals are likely to make better neighbors in that they tend to 
invest more in exterior maintenance, have a greater sense of social 
responsibility, and are more politically active (Dubin and Sung 1990). 
This is consistent with the empirical work of Kain and Quigley (1970) 
who found that a house with otherwise identical characteristics 
located in a census tract in which the highest median grade completed 
is the eighth grade will have a market value $1,900 less than one 
located in a census tract where the highest median grade completed is 
the tenth grade. 
Even though many people call for more racial integration, in 
reality many or all of those people live in a more homogenized 
neighborhood. However, the racial composition of a neighborhood is 
very important to many people and this factor has been found to affect 
the housing prices of a neighborhood. Kain and Quigley (1970) and 
Brookshire et al. {1982) studied the effect of the racial composition of a 
neighborhood on housing prices and found it to have a negative 
effect, while the study of Baltimore housing prices and neighborhood 
quality by Dubin and Sung (1990) found that race is an important 
characteristic affecting housing prices and is associated with 
socioeconomic status. This is consistent with Emerson (1972) and 
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Muth (1969), who argue that if income were accounted for, the effect of 
race would be insignificance. They conclude that one cannot research 
the effects of race withou.c controlling for the influences of income, 
education, and other socioeconomic characteristics which might 
equally affect market behavior. 
This section has presented a discussion of the housing market 
by analyzing the supply-demand framework and land use and 
housing prices. The next section reviews and analyzes the empirical 
studies which were conducted on the effect of land use controls on 
land and housing prices. This will lay the foundation for developing 
a model for examining the relationship between UGBs and housing 
prices. 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF LAND USE CONTROLS 
AND HOUSING PRICES 
For several decades, land use controls and housing prices have 
been an important area of research. However, even though UGBs 
have been known for decades and used in growth management 
policies, there are no known studies that analyze the effect of UGBs on 
housing prices except one unpublished study by Alkadi and 
Strathman (1994). Nevertheless, in addition to analyzing the available 
research on UGBs and their price effect, this study uses and analyzes 
research that tests the effect of other growth-management programs 
that share similar purposes as UGBs. 
As has been previously noted, housing prices are affected by the 
supply mechanisms of the marl5_et._Th~_l!\ajo_r___argument against 
UGBs is that they constrain urban land supply, which forces land 
values to increase and in turn this increase might be capitalized in the 
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price of housing. Whitelaw's theory tends I to support this argument 
by stating that effective UGBs, by restricting1 bids only to land within 
their boundaries, operate much like ordinary zoning constraints, 
causing these urban lands to rise in value,! while rural land outside 
the UGB drops in value (Knaap <1nd Nelson 1992; Nelson 1994). 
These effects are illustratep in Figure! 5. Where Rm represents 
the land value gradient for urban land in the absence of a UGB and Rg 
represents the land value gradient for urban1 land after the imposition 
of a UGB at u2. Following the imposition of the UGB, land values 
beyond the boundary fall becaupe urban development is no longer 
allowed. At the same time, land values inside the boundary at u2 rise, 
those who would have bid for lC).nd outside the UGB are constrained 
to bid for land inside the boundary. The gap in the gradient Rg offers a 
measure of the effects of the UGB. The greater the gap, the greater the 
impact. 
Empirical research has qu,antified this effect, with one of the 
pioneer attempts being Gleenso11's 1979 study which tries to analyze 
the effect of Brooklyn Park's grqwth management program on land 
values. Brooklyn Park, Minnesotfl, is a suburb about 20 miles north of 
Minneapolis. The program was intended to surround urban 
development and prevent it from expanding into agricultural land. 
Fulfilling this purpose, the prog~·am restrict12d the extension of public 
services into the agriculture area, Knaap (1982) believes this program 
looks similar in concept to UGBs in Oregorl but does not encompass 
the urban area which makes the boundary 1 incapable of constraining 
urban land supplies. 
In fact, this program does constrain urban land supplies, 
through limiting development tp the point I where public services are 
restricted; otherwise Gleenson (1979) would hot have found any effect 
31 
on urban land. He found significant differences between the prices of 
farmland that was not currently developable under Brooklyn Park's 
program and urban land that was developable. Nevertheless, Kelly 
(1992) cited Knaap criticizing Gleenson's study. Knaap's argument is 
that Brooklyn Park appears to be too small to have a significant impact 
on the housing market of the Twin Cities region. Therefore, without 
comparing Gleenson's finding to land values for the entire region, it 
is impossible to know why the program in Brooklyn Park appears to 
have had that effect. 
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Figure 5. UGB and Supply Restriction Effects. Source: Knaap 
and Nelson 1992. 
Similar to Brooklyn Park's program is San Jose's growth 
management program. In 1976 the San Jose City Council established 
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the San Jose Urban Services Boundary, a line beyond which essential 
publk infrastructure would not be extended. New home 
development outside the boundary, even within city limits, was 
effectively prohibited. In fact, the San Jose Urban Services Boundary 
was never intended to restrict the number of new housing dwellings 
constructed; it was intended to slow the general rate of rural land 
conversion by promoting higher residential densities and to redirect 
new home construction from outlying developing area of San Jose to 
more developed infill areas (Landis 1986). 
Some planners think that redirecting development from 
outlying developing areas of a city to more developed infill areas and 
promoting high'er densities of development will solve urban sprawl 
probl,erns without any negative consequences on the housing market. 
Landis' 1986 study demonstrates that this kind of development 
absolutely affects the housing market, with the average new single-
family horne sales price more than doubling within five years. What 
used to sell for $53,700 in San Jose in 1975 sold for $129,700 in 1980. 
Landjs (1986) attributes this to the scarcity of raw land, arguing that 
some builders found themselves bidding on five- and ten-acre parcels 
that only four years previously they had judged too small to support 
horn(!-building. , 
This demonstrates that supplying enough developable land 
within growth boundaries through infill is not good enough as home 
build~rs look for large parcels to benefit from economies of scale. In 
addition, constrl1ction prices within developed areas could increase 
because of more restrictions on the builder due to difficulties of 
rnovi~1g trucks ahd materials in an_d out gi_.Hr_~qs w.bere more of their 
vaca11t lots are built. All these extra costs would be capitalized in 
housing prices. , In fast-growing metropolitan areas, turning future 
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growth inward might push housing costs inside the UGBs notably 
higher (Downs 1994). 
In fact, constraining land supply could empower the horne-
building industry. Lillydahl and Singell (1987) argue that 
communities that restrict the amount of developable land are likely to 
be dominated by a relatively small number of horne builders. 
According to Solow (1974) and Kelly (1992), these builders can exercise 
a monopoly power over the prices and the types of homes built. 
Solow (1974) argues that if the net price of land were to rise too fast, 
resource deposits would be an excellent way to hold wealth, and 
owners would delay production (e.g., of homes) while they enjoyed 
supernormal capital gains. 
The 1986 study by Landis analyzed the effect of the urban 
growth management system in Fresno, California. Like San Jose, 
Fresno's program intended to shift development away from the urban 
fringe back inward to fill vacant parcels in previously developed areas. 
In order to fulfill this purpose, the city of Fresno required developers 
proposing to build single-family detached homes at the urban fringe to 
pay fees of as much as $5,000 per unit, while builders proposing 
projects in built-up areas typically paid less than $2,000 per unit. 
As a result of this policy, Landis's study found that developable 
parcels inside city limits sold for upwards of $60,000 per acre in 1980, 
while comparable land just outside Fresno city limits sold for less than 
$20,000 per raw acre. This shows that the building lower fees are 
capitalized in the land values. It is similar, as discussed earlier, to 
areas with lower tax rates, which tend to witness higher land and 
housing prices. However, Landis (1986) argues that even after paying 
the required fees, developers who owned land on the fringes of Fresno 
could build and market new homes at a considerably lower price than 
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could the developers of new homes located within city limits. 
Unfortunately, he did not give any justification for this significant 
difference between the two markets. Nevertheless, without including 
other factors that would affect Fresno's housing market, it would be 
difficult from Landis's 1986 study to explain the difference between the 
two markets. For example, many empirical studies, as illustrated 
earlier, demonstrated that proximity to CBDs and employment centers 
do affect housing prices positively. So what Landis's 1986 study could 
not tell us was whether the higher prices within Fresno's city limit 
was attributable to proximity to the CBD and/ or employment center. 
Like Fresno and San Jose, Sacramento adopted an urban 
services boundary policy, but Sacramento's policy favored constantly 
making new land available as the development needed it. This was 
intended to open up land preserved for agriculture to residential 
developers rather than having infill development (Burrows 1978; 
Johnson et al. 1984). For example, in 1978 10,000 acres of undeveloped 
land were included within the boundary to accommodate 100,000 
residents. Mainly as a result of this policy, Sacramento's housing 
market did not witness a significant increase in its housing prices as 
Fresno's and San Jose's housing markets did. In 1980, the mean sales 
prices of single family units were $83,000, $99,300, $129,000 for 
Sacramento, Fresno, and San Jose, respectively (Landis 1986). 
However, there could be other factors which contributed to 
Sacramento's lack of a significant increase, such as Proposition 13, 
which rolled back property tax assessments to 1975 levels, permitted 
an annual increase in assessment of only 2 percent except in the event 
of a sale and, for all practical purp_o_s.e..s, __ C!:!pp_e.d_prnperty tax rates at 1 
percent per year (Pluton 1993). 
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Another growth management program that affected land and 
housing prices was the Pineland program in New Jersey. The New 
Jersey Pineland is an ar~a of approximately one million acres in 
southern New Jersey. In 1978, President Carter signed the National 
Parks and Recreation Act that created the Pineland National Reserve. 
The program divided the Pineland area into six districts in which 
some districts were more restrictive to development than others. 
An empirical study by Beaton {1991) examined the effect of this 
program on land and housing prices; this shtdy used a cross-sectional 
data base consisting of sales that occurred during the period between 
1966 and 1986. The study found that the greater the intensity of 
restrictions, the greater the rise in value. In particular residential 
properties in both the preservation and development areas, the most 
restrictive districts, appear to have capitalized the effect of the 
Pineland policies by more than 10 percent of their market values. By 
contrast, vacant land values in these most restrictive zones fell 
following the program adoption, while vacant land values in the least 
restrictive zones rose. The decrease in vacant land values in the most 
restrictive zones was because the right of development was taken 
away from landowners. 
There are three studies that are directly related to UGBs. The 
works of Beaton et al. {1977), Knaap {1981, 1982, and 1985), and Nelson 
(1984 and 1986) deal with UGBs and pricing effects. The Beaton et al. 
{1977) work, which pioneered these studies, analyzed the effect of 
Salem, Oregon's UGB on land values; this study was conducted 
immediately after the UGB adoption in 1975, using 1976 sales price 
data. The study analyzed 105 und~ve.!Qp_ed_P-.<!.rcel~__g_f land located both 
inside and outside the Salem UGB but could not find any effect on 
land prices attributable to the UGB. 
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Knaap tried to give two explanations for these results, the first 
being that the UGB may have been imposed well beyond the reaches 
of viable urban developr1tent at the time, especially since the UGB 
encompassed 25 percent more land than necessary to achieve 100 
percent buildout by the year 2000, based on urban growth projections 
(Knaap 1982; Knaap and Nelson 1992). The second explanation was 
that the UGB did not have enough time to show an effect because the 
Beaton et al. (1977) study was conducted immediately one year after 
the UGB was officially recognized. 
However, seven years after the Beaton et al. (1977) study was 
conducted, Nelson (1984, 1986) tried to reevaluate the effect of the 
Salem UGB on land values. He analyzed 209 unimproved land sales 
between 1977 and 1979 both inside and outside the Salem UGB. 
Although Nelson's 1984 and 1986 studies used sales data for years only 
two years after those used by Beaton et al. (1977), his study found that 
Salem's UGB significantly affected land values. This demonstrates 
Knaap's (1982) argument that the Beaton et al. (1977) study did not 
allow enough time for the Salem UGB to show its effect on land 
values. 
Nevertheless, Nelson's 1984 and 1986 studies demonstrate that 
land values varied significantly according to their distance from the 
boundary. The study found that land values inside the UGB decreased 
with distance from the urban core at locations greater than 5,000 feet 
from the CBD. This finding was in line with other empirical studies, 
which showed that proximity to the urban core increases land and 
housing prices. On the other hand, the study found that within 5,000 
feet from the boundary, land valt.!.l:.~.uise wHh_dist.ance from the urban 
core, as the amenity value of proximity to rural land beyond the UGB 
began to exceed the value of proximity to the urban core. 
-------·----
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A similar study was conducted by Knaap (1982, 1985) in the 
Portland metropolitan area. This study, which was conducted four 
years after the UGB was ~rafted, analyzed 900 unimproved land sales 
recorded in fiscal year 1979-1980. The analysis demonstrates that the 
value of a raw acre of land 50 minutes from downtown Portland 
equals $35,697 if located inside the UGB, while the value of the same 
acre outside the UGB falls to $19,688 (Knaap and Nelson 1992). This 
result surprised policy makers with the Metropolitan Service District, 
the regional government of the Portland metropolitan area. They 
argued that a 15.3-percent market factor of excess vacant land within 
the UGB should prevent any price inflation. Knaap rejected their 
argument, and noted that the UGB had been in place long enough to 
influence the expectations of participants in the land market and thus 
had affected land value even without affecting land supply (Knaap 
and Nelson 1992). 
Although Knaap's 1982 and 1985 studies found the UGB to be 
significant in affecting the Portland area's land values, it should be 
noted that Portland's UGB was not adopted until October 1980. This 
means that Knaap's studies included only two months of post-UGB 
data. However, the expectations of participants in the land market 
could have been affected by the fear of a stringent UGB and hence they 
could have immediately acted in the land market by acquiring more 
land from within the drafted UGB market. This is supported by 
Lillydahl and Singell (1987), when they argue that even if growth 
controls are not actually in effect, if the city leaders favor such controls 
or if residents anticipate the enactment of such controls, prices may 
increase in antici12ation of contm.l.s_,__ILI.<.naap's. study had been 
conducted within a reasonable time after the adoption of the UGB and 
everybody had been certain about the final lines of the UGB, then the 
38 
land values would not have shown any effect. This1 is exactly what 
happened with the Beaton et al. 1977 study, whe:n they did not fi:nd 
any price effects due to Sa~em's UGB because they did. their study o.ne 
year after Salem's UGB was adopted in 1975, althOt~gh it was drafted in 
1973. So if their study had been conducted after 1973. but before 1975 
the adoption year- they might have seen an effect due to uncertainty 
about Salem's UGB final lines. 
Besides general housing price increases, UGBs can afff-ct 
housing opportunities and choices, which mq.y l1ead to further 
increases in the prices of the more desirable typeE; of housing and to 
higher level of frustration in the market among those who do not 
obtain their preferred form of housing. This section! presents a b\d-
rent function to illustrate this situation. 
The simple model of the bid-rent function assumes that every 
household has the same demand for housing. Hpwe·,ver, the prest3nt 
discussion assumes that we have two types of hquseholds in a city, 
large and small. Several factors influence a hous~~hold's demand for 
housing, for example the number of children. Hquseholds with fe~w 
children live in small dwellings, and households with more childr~n 
live in large dwellings (Sullivan 1990). 
It has been shown that land and housing values! increase as tpe 
distance from the CBD decreases. Holding transportation costs and 
other factors constant, smaller households would have a steeper 
housing price function because they consume less housing (Sulliv~m 
1990), while larger households would have a fl<~tter housing price 
function because they consume more housing. Th.is is represented .in 
Figure 6, where the two functions. intersec.La.La cHstance of A* from 
the CBD. So, any space before point A* would b~~ occmpied by sm~lll 
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households, while any space after point A* would be occupied by large 
households. The price at the intersect point would be at P*. 
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Figure 6. Bid-Rent Function and Household Size. Source: 
Sullivan 1990. 
Now, let us assume the imposition of a UGB after point A*, 
where the two functions intersect. The UGB imposition would cause 
the large household function to shift up due to constraint on land and 
in turn on housing supply. Figure 7 shows the new intersection 
between the small and the large household functions at point A and 
the price at point P. The consequences of this is higher prices for less 
space. As discussed below, higher prices then reflect a pure social cost 
because the efficiency of society's resource allocations has decreased 
(Downs 1994). This is represented in the shaded triangle in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Bid-Rent Function and Household Size after 
the UGB is Imposed. 
This demonstrates that a cost to society results unless localities 
encompass in their boundaries enough land supply for each type of 
housing, this is because each housing type has its own demand. In 
addition, since not all land supplied has the same locational qualities 
or prestige a shortage of parcels with unusual qualities can still occur 
while the total supply of developable land remains adequate. For 
example, the price of single-family lots in Lake Oswego has risen 
much more than average land prices in the entire Portland 
metropolitan area. If this increase is due to the exclusivity of the 
community rather than to the _s~ation _()j_!llor~parks, better schools, 
and other amenities, then it is likely to have a net harmful effect on 
social welfare even though the increase provides net benefits to 
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homeowners (Fischel 1991; Downs 1994). The situation represented 
previously by Figure 4 may possibly occur without the imposition of a 
UGB, but will almost certdinly occur with the imposition of a UGB. 
It could happen in some cases, at the time of drawing up UGBs, 
that residential development outside the UGBs could take place either 
prior to or after the adoption of the UGBs. The latter case could be due 
to failure of the UGBs or it could simply be the product of normal 
slippage. For example, compared to the total development inside and 
outside the UGBs, development outside the UGBs was below 5 percent 
in Portland, 24 percent in Medford, and 37 percent in Brooking. In any 
case, this development outside the UGBs could cause housing prices 
inside the UGBs to escalate. Toulan {1994) demonstrates that 
emerging belts of very low density residential areas outside UGBs are 
certain to pose strong challenges to the future urban form of the 
growing regions as they become a more formidable barrier than the 
UGBs themselves. 
Consequently, as housing prices rise and the demand on land 
and housing grow, developers are encouraged to leapfrog over the 
closer, more expensive land and go well out into the country to find 
land cheap enough to build on (Toulan 1965). If developers cannot, 
for any reason, escape the inflated market by leapfrogging to cheaper 
markets, then inflation will get worse. 
Regardless of the total supply of land, reductions in one area 
may be offset by increases in others. This increase in supply may be 
reflected in housing price increases in nearby communities 
(Montgomery and Mandelker 1989) or could be represented by an 
increase in housing construction activities. Hence. the effect of UGBs 
on housing prices may not be seen within the actual communities 
that adopted them, but may shift to nearby communities. In fact, the 
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extent to which local growth management policies increase housing 
prices varies in accordance with the principle of housing supply 
substitutability. This priHciple states that the effect of any locality's 
growth management policies on its housing prices will depend on 
how easily people priced out of living there can find similar housing 
available in nearby localities (Lillydahl and Singell 1987; Chinitz 1990; 
Landis 1992; Downs 1994; Schwartz et al. 1986). 
The empirical work of Schwartz et al. (1981) demonstrated this 
principle when they found that there was no significant difference in 
increases in housing prices in Petaluma as compared with Rohnert 
Park, where growth control was not applied, although their study did 
find that building permits increased sharply in Rohnert Park after 
growth control in Petaluma took place. They concluded that where 
perfect substitution exists, growth controls will not increase housing 
prices in the city but they will increase the quantity of houses 
constructed in surrounding communities. 
Further, Landis (1992) compared two communities from 
California- Thousand Oaks, where growth control was adopted, and 
Simi Valley, where growth control was not adopted. He did not find 
significant difference in increases in housing prices in Thousand Oaks 
as compared with Simi Valley, but he did find that after Simi Valley 
adopted its own growth controls in 1986, the housing prices increased 
in Thousand Oaks faster than in surrounding communities. "In other 
words, only when the breathing room provided by Simi Valley 
disappeared, did housing prices in Thousand Oaks begin to rise 
rapidly" (Landis 1992, p. 496). 
However, if localities do nQ.l_jlllo~~l}Q_ugl).__j_and supply within 
UGBs to be absorbed in a given period, the final price of developed 
property will increase. If the limitation is stringent enough, it will 
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confer monopolistic pow~rs on the owners of those sites, permitting 
them to raise land prices l)ubstantially. For example, if a community 
designates 1000 acres for l.ousing for five years of development where 
only 200 acres per year is abso~bed, the owners of these 1000 acres could 
charge developers very high prices for sites, which would compel the 
developers to charge highE~r p~ices for the housing there (Downs 1994). 
Consequently, leapfrog d1~vek)pment into other communities may 
take place (Toulan 1965; Kelly 1992). Nevertheless, Downs {1994) 
argues that no one has empirically determined exactly how much the 
available supply of land must be in relation to average annual 
absorption rates, in order to avoid an increase in housing prices. He 
does, however, state that the land supplied should be at least two or 
three times as large as annual absorption rates. 
Although the previous discussion demonstrates that many 
empirical studies have attributed increases in housing prices to urban 
growth management programs, proponents of these programs argue 
that many researchers hav«.~ failled to account for price increases due to 
demand shifts. Deakin {1992), for example, argues that public 
regulatory, infrastructure, and tax policies can increase land and lot 
prices, but so can population,: job, and income growth. One of the 
reasons for widely disparate findings on the magnitude of price effects 
is that researchers have sometimes failed to account for price increases 
due to demand shifts an~:l erroneously attribute all price effects to 
growth control. 
Toulan {1994) argue~ that some researchers have failed to find 
or isolate the real variables that affect housing prices and he states that 
"the Portland UGB does npt s~~em to have created any imbalances in 
the land market" (p. 114). Thils conclusion was based on comparing 
Portland to a group of similar :western cities. Although Portland was 
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compared to cities that did not have growth management programs, 
the comparison showed that the Portland area did not have abnormal 
increases in land priceE>, though Toulan (1994) emphasized the 
importance of national trends to control for external changes. 
In addition, some scholars, including Kelly (1992) and Downs 
(1994), argue that if a community adopts a UGB that extends out too 
far from the city then it would have little if any impact on the land 
market. That is why officials in the Portland metropolitan area were 
surprised when Knaap (1981, 1982) found that Portland's UGB 
increased land values, although more than a 15-percent surplus of 
land was included in the UGB forecast for the year 2000. Kelly (1992) 
argues that if we do see an effect on the land market from UGBs, even 
though they are extended out far from the city, this effect could be a 
psychological rather than practical shortage of land supply. 
Kelly (1992) also argues that most communities that adopt 
growth management programs, including Ramapo, Livermore, and 
Petaluma, are part of larger metropolitan areas and therefore do not 
control enough of the market for their actions to affect land prices 
significantly. On the other hand, these communities were high-
growth when they adopted their programs because location, 
amenities, or other factors caused them to attract growth. Those 
factors may bring a premium to land in such communities, even if 
there is a significant supply of competing land in the area. 
For example, Kelly disagrees with Schwartz et al. (1984) when 
they found a significant increase in Petaluma's housing prices after 
the adoption of its growth program and in comparison to Santa Rosa, 
California, which had no growth rgsJJiclirrn,_.Kelly_(1992) believes that 
Petaluma was a more expensive community even before it adopted its 
growth management program and he goes further and questions 
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whether growth management might thus be a symptom of other 
factors tending to make development and housing both more 
expensive in the community or whether it is the cause of some of the 
later price increases. 
Miller (1986) also criticized Schwartz et al. (1984) for their 
focusing only on new houses, which gave them the opportunity to 
discuss the production of moderately priced housing rather than the 
provision of moderately priced housing. He argues that there is a 
distinction between the supply of houses built for new residents every 
year and the supply of houses available for purchase by new residents 
every year. In addition, Miller (1986) criticized Schwartz et al. (1984) 
for their exclusion of Rohnert Park from their 1984 study about 
Petaluma and Santa Rosa while using as data for this study the 1981 
study's findings which did include Rohnert Park. 
Although Schwartz and his colleagues are the ones who have 
been criticized for the pitfalls in their 1984 study, they are among those 
who believe that many researchers have failed to use the proper 
methods for deducing the effect of growth controls on housing prices. 
Like Toulan (1994) and Deakin (1992), they argue that many 
researchers have failed to measure and control for the real factors that 
affect housing prices, such as differences in housing characteristics, 
amenities, and public service quality. However, they argue that the 
careful researcher ought to use multiple methods to test the effect of a 
particular growth management. 
Further, Landis (1991) selected seven pairs of communities 
from California, where each pair included one community that 
managed growth and one that did not. He analyzed the rate of 
increase in median single family horne prices and found that the 
median prices did not rise any faster or to higher levels in the seven 
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case-study communities than in their counterpart pro-growth cities. 
He gave some explanations of his results insofar as they contradict the 
law of supply and demand. First, the controls as implemented may 
not really be all that effective and second, there may be adequate 
spillover opportunities in other nearby communities, so that growth 
displaced from one city can easily and costlessly be accommodated in 
nearby or adjacent communities. Landis (1992) used median housing 
sale prices, but did not acknowledge the problems inherent in using 
them (Toulan 1994; Kelly 1992). 
A further argument that could support proponents of UGBs is 
that they lead to increase in densities (Peiser 1989) which would in 
turn lead to lower housing prices. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Previous analyses have shown that housing prices are 
influenced by several factors which are either part of the supply-
demand function or related to land use characteristics. The latter 
include accessibility factors, public services factors, structure and site 
factors, and neighborhood factors. The supply-demand function 
include land, labor, capital, and materials on the supply side, and 
population growth, increasing incomes, decentralization of 
population, and interest rates on the demand side. The discussion 
demonstrates that UGBs and other land use controls influence the 
housing market by constraining the amount of land supplied for 
housing. Several empirical case studies have been reviewed but 
unfortunately, none of them analy2:ed th~--~[t~c::t qf_UGBs on housing 
prices. 
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However, most studies demonstrate increases in land values 
due to UGBs or increases in both land values and housing prices due 
to other growth controls. On the other hand, some scholars argue that 
UGBs and other growth controls do not increase housing prices. 
Some researchers fail to include and isolate the variables that cause 
housing prices to increase. As a result of this confusion, many policy 
makers are unclear about whether UGBs do cause housing prices to 
increase. 
This research is an attempt to dispel some of the mystery about 
the relationship between UGBs and housing prices by extending the 
analysis to include additional factors contributing to housing prices. 
The study uses a least-squares statistical model to analyze data from 
Washington County, Oregon. The next chapter addresses these issues 
as it reviews the research methodology. 
------· -· ··--------··. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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The purpose of this chapter is to present the methodology for 
this study. The discussion is in six sections. The first presents the 
problem statement. The second section discusses the quantifiable 
factors that are related to housing prices. The third section presents 
the research hypotheses. The fourth section presents the research 
models used in the analysis. The fifth section discusses the conceptjJ.al 
and operational model for this study. The sixth section discusses the 
variable measurements and data sources. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
As mentioned earlier, over the last several decades urban 
sprawl and increasing levels of rural and farm land consumption 
have become two of the major problems facing many urban areas. 
Many localities have adopted growth management methot,:ls, 
including UGBs, to overcome these problems. A number of scholi~rs 
and policy makers argue that UGBs cause housing prices to incre~tse 
and because of this many less affluent people are driven away frqm 
the housing market as this increase in housing prices affects housing 
affordability. On the other hand, some scholars maintain that uqBs 
do not increase housing prices, arguing that researchers have failed to 
include and isolate_J.he Y..c:1!iables that are the real cause of housing 
price increases. 
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This research attempts to examine the relationship between 
UGBs and housing prices. The problem is complex, and the factors 
contributing to housing IJrices are numerous. Some of these factors 
are measurable and tangible, while others are subjective and 
intangible. The following section presents the quantifiable factors that 
contribute to housing prices. 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO HOUSING PRICES 
Previously reviewed studies have shown that the classic 
models of urban rent determination have focused mainly on the 
transportation savings associated with alternative locations. In the 
last few years, however, urban experts have begun to focus on the 
ways in which amenities, disamenities, supply and demand factors, 
and local growth controls affect housing prices. 
As for the demand factors, many researchers found that interest 
rates (Snyder and Stegman 1986; Manchester 1986; Singell and 
Lillydahl 1990; Segal and Srinivasan 1985; Pollakowski and Wachter 
1990), population (Beaton 1982; Segal and Srinivasan 1985; Black and 
Hoben 1985), and income (Fischel 1991; Segal and Srinivasan 1985; 
Black and Hoben 1985; Dubin 1990; Smith 1989; Lee 1968; Muth 1960), 
affected housing prices. 
Accessibility factors are among the influential contributors to 
housing prices. Many researchers found that proximity to CBD (Lloyd 
and Dicken 1977; Alonso 1964; Meyer et al. 1965), employment and 
shopping centers (Miller 1982; Waldo 1974; Harrison and Rubinfeld 
1978; Brookshire et al. 1982; Gamble and Downing 1982), major 
freeways (Peiser 1989; Kelly 1992; Johnson and Ragas 1987), elementary 
schools (Miller 1982; Li and Brown 1980; Johnson and Lea 1982), and 
50 
recreation areas such as parks, lakes and waterfront (Gamble and 
Downing 1982; Miller 1982; Correll et al. 1978; Nelson 1984; Palmquist 
1980), will affect housing prices. 
There are public services factors among those contributors to 
the housing prices. Most of the empirical studies focused on school 
quality and found it to affect housing prices (Dubin and Sung 1990; Li 
and Brown 1980; Oates 1969; Kain and Quigley 1970). Besides this 
factor, property taxes were also found to affect housing prices (Oates 
1969; Knaap 1981) if there are widely varying tax rates across many 
jurisdictions (Hushak 1975). 
Structure and site factors were also found to be major 
contributors to housing prices and the empirical work of Harrison 
and Rubinfeld (1978), Palmquist (1980), Singell and Lillydahl (1990) , 
Lafferty (1984), Brookshire et al. (1982), Hughes and Sirmans (1992), 
Brown and Pollakowski (1977), Kain and Quigley (1970), Gamble and 
Downing (1982), Nelson, Genereux and Genereux (1992), Johnson and 
Lea (1982), and Dubin (1992) found that lot size, age of the house, 
number of bedrooms, area of the interior living area, number of 
bathrooms, number of stories, number of garages, number of 
fireplaces, and the availability of a basement (Dubin 1992; Johnson and 
Lea 1982; Gamble and Downing 1992) had a positive effect on housing 
prices, but a basement could have a negative effect if the house in the 
sample is old (Alkadi and Strathman 1994). 
Many researchers emphasized the importance of neighborhood 
quality factors and tried to test for their effect on housing prices. The 
empirical studies found that crime rates (Dubin and Sung 1990; Kain 
and Quigley 1970), level of incom~_QUh~n~ighbors_ (Dubin and Sung 
1990; Knaap 1982, 1985), the education level of the neighbors (Kain and 
Quigley 1970; Dubin and Sung 1990), and the racial composition of a 
-------,---,---------
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neighborhood (Brookshire et al. 1982; Kain and Quigley 1970; Dubin 
and Sung 1990) also had an effect on housing prices. 
The next section lists ! the research hypotheses this study 
examines to shed light on the relationship between housing prices 
and various factors related to the imposition of the UGB. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
This analysis examines the following hypotheses: 
1. The rate of increase in the price of housing after the 
imposition qf th1e UGB is significantly greater than the 
rate of increase in the price of housing before the 
imposition qf the UGB. 
2. In the perio~l after the imposition of the UGB, the rate 
of increase in housing prices in each of four successive 
periods is significantly greater in each period than in 
the preceding period. 
3. The differen.ce in the rate of increase in housing price 
between sin.gle-family houses on large lots and on 
small lots is greater in the period after the UGB than in 
the period bdore. 
4. In the period after the imposition of the UGB, the 
difference in the rate of increase in housing prices in 
each of four successive periods between single-family 
houses on l~uge 1lots and on small lots is significantly 
greater in each perio.c:l tha[l_jD_J?.rececling period. 
5. Housing prrices 1 increase as distance to the UGB 
decreases. 
MODELS FOR EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN UGBs AND HOUSING PRICES 
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To test the foregoing hypotheses, different models were 
analyzed in an effort to identity the best model for capturing the 
relationships between various factors and housing price. As noted 
earlier there is not a single study that analyzes the effect of UGBs on 
housing prices, except the unpublished one by Alkadi and Strathman 
(1994). The studies reviewed in this work either dealt with UGBs and 
their effect on land values or analyzed other growth management 
programs and their effect on land values and/or housing prices. The 
studies that dealt with the UGBs and their effect on land values 
(Beaton et al. 1977; Knaap 1982; 1985; Nelson 1984; 1986) employed 
posttest-only models in which urban and non-urban variables in the 
post-UGB period were compared using the method of least-squares 
regression. Similarly, the studies that dealt with other growth 
management programs and their effect on land values and/or 
housing prices employed posttest-only models in which postcontrol 
urban and non-urban variables (Gleeson 1979) and postcontrol 
restrictive and less restrictive zones (Beaton 1991) were compared 
using the method of least-squares regression. All of the above studies 
did their comparisons within the same communities. Landis (1986), 
however, compared pairs of postcontrol cities with and without 
growth controls, although he analyzed his data without regression 
models. 
These posttest models .have_their... ow_n shortcomings. 
According to Schwartz et al. (1986), these posttest-only models cannot 
control for any differences that existed before growth controls were 
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implemented. Such differences will therefore be incorrectly attributed 
to the growth-control programs. Further, these posttest-only models 
assume that comparable communities without growth control 
programs are independent of those with growth control. If, however, 
this is not the case and housing markets are in fact interdependent, 
the community with the growth-control program will affect the 
market for housing attributes in the nearby (nongrowth-control) 
communities and cause their implicit prices to change. Thus, the 
results will be biased, and will understate the true growth-control 
effect. Further, Fischel (1991) argues that studying an entire 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in which some communities with 
growth controls have higher housing prices than other MSAs is an 
imperfect measure. He explains that this is because some of the 
increase in housing prices could be due to communities making 
themselves more attractive relative to others and that growing areas 
are more likely to adopt growth controls than others, so that land 
values would have risen even without the growth controls. 
Few studies focused on variables of a particular growth-control 
program and the characteristics of surrounding areas using time-series 
data and least-squares regression. In fact none of the studies reviewed 
in this research have used such models. These models require the 
researcher to do before-and-after comparisons of the growth-
controlled community without the need for a comparison to a control 
group. The advantage of these types of models is that the 
interdependence of housing markets is not an issue. 
However, Schwartz et al. (1986) argued that these models have 
shortcomings in that they cannot control for changes in price over 
time that are not due to growth controls, such as changes due to 
fluctuations in interest rates or inflationary expectations that alter 
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demand. In fact, this shortcoming can be overcome and many studies 
have overcome it by including the interest rate as an independent 
variable to control for changes due to fluctuations in interef.)t rates 
(Manchester 1986; Singell and Lillydahl 1990; Segal and Sriyinasan 
1985; Pollakowski and Wachter 1990). 
The inflationary problem was solved by several different 
techniques. Miller (1986) noted that some studies used techniques to 
control for inflation. For example, Palmquist (1980) used adju~tments 
for nominal value changes over time, including a time c:;lummy 
variable in a time-series analysis, where the dummy is t1sed to 
calculate the real estate price index. The usual alternative technique is 
to develop a separate regression model for each year and calcq.late an 
index based on the change in the estimated regression coeffich.mts for 
each attribute for each period. By introducing a time ind~x, the 
researcher is essentially performing a pretest-posttest apalysis, 
comparing the precontrol period with the postcontrol period. 
The time index approach has been used by several studie;s, such 
as that by Nelson (1984), who argued that rather than deflating sales 
prices by regional or national consumer price deflators, the timE.~ index 
has the advantage of indicating local inflationary tendenci~s and 
changing market conditions over time. Unlike Nelson, Ubq (1994) 
used the deflation technique. The deflation technique is ge:nerally 
preferred over the time index technique with regard to accuracy{ as the 
time index technique assumes that the inflation rate is constant over 
time- an incorrect assumption. 
Sometimes an individual city needs closer examinat~on in 
order to choose the proper techniqug_b.Jl.s.e..d __ Qn_ the characteri~~tics of 
that city. Deflating by national indices is crude, especially in the case of 
the Portland area because the early 1980s saw negative inflation. while 
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the nation as a whole was still experiencing some inflation. It follows, 
then, that in the case of the Portland area, the time index would be the 
better technique to use. 
Although related to housing prices, pretest-posttest comparison 
models have not been used in many studies. They were used in the 
studies of Singell and Lillydahl {1990) and Urban Land Institute and 
Gruen, Gruen and Associates {1977), but the growth controls involved 
were different from UGBs. 
To overcome the shortcoming of both the posttest comparison 
and pretest-posttest comparison models, some scholars have 
recommended combining them to form a pretest-posttest comparison 
with a control group, although this model still does not overcome the 
problem of an interdependent housing market (Schwartz 1986). 
Based on the previous discussion about the three model 
approaches (posttest-only, pretest-posttest, and pretest-posttest with 
control group), the pretest-posttest comparison would be more 
suitable to this study for several reasons. First, since this study intends 
to use Washington County, Oregon, as the study area, it is difficult to 
find a nearby comparable community both without a UGB and 
independent in its housing market. For example, Vancouver, 
Washington, which has no UGB, could act as the control group, since 
it is comparable to the Portland area. Unfortunately, Vancouver's 
housing market is interdependent with Portland's and this fact is 
enough to eliminate the posttest-only comparison model. 
Secondly, the pretest-posttest with comparison to control group 
is time consuming and would not solve the issue of the 
interdependence in housing market. Therefore, this approach is 
eliminated too. 
56 
The weakness of the pretest-posttest approach is controlling for 
the interest rates and inflation, but as discussed earlier these issues can 
be overcome by different i.echniques. As a result, the pretest-posttest is 
the most suitable approach for this study. 
CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL MODEL 
Developing a model that is suitable for examining the effect of 
UGBs on housing prices is a crucial issue. The design of the model 
will not be influenced only by the factors contributing to housing 
prices but also by the characteristics of the analyzed area. As discussed 
above, there are three approaches which can be utilized to model the 
effect of UGBs on housing prices: a one-time comparison of housing 
prices between UGB and non-UGB communities after the UGB is 
instituted, a before-and-after comparison in the UGB community 
only, and before-after comparison between the UGB community and a 
non-UGB community. As noted, a before-and-after comparison 
within the UGB community model is the most suitable for this 
research. 
In order to apply the before-and-after comparison within the 
UGB community, a pre-post dummy variable is utilized to distinguish 
the periods before and after the implementation of the UGB. In 
addition to using a dummy variable to distinguish these periods, 
interaction variables such as time by lot size are used to test for the 
effect of the UGB. 
Land supply before the imposition of the UGB was not 
constrained and was elastic. With the imposition of the UGB land 
supply became finite at least for the designated period (until the year 
2000 for the Portland metropolitan area). Therefore, as time passes the 
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raw land supply within the UGB decreases. Two consequences result 
from these factors. The first is that choices from the available land 
supply become limited. Second, owners of land that is available for 
development enjoy a monopoly and prices on this property becomes 
inflated. The sum result of these two factors is that the price of a 
single foot become more expensive. 
Figure 8 illustrates this effect. The supply curve SU represents 
the unconstrained land supply before the UGB. After the imposition 
of the UGB, land supply became constrained, and this is shown by the 
supply curve SC. As time passes, demand for land increases. Figure 8 
shows the quantity demanded at different periods of time, Dn, Dt2, Dt3, 
and Dt4. With land supply fixed at SC land prices increase more than 
at SU, when land supply was unconstrained. 
p 
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Figure 8. Changes in Demand for Land as Time Passes while 
Land Supply is Constrained by the Imposition of the UGB. 
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To test this effect, this research interacted the time variable with 
the lot size variable. '1Thi~ interaction allowed this study to measure 
the effect qf the UGB. If there is an effect, the coefficient of the 
interaction variable must be greater than zero. At the same time, if 
the coeffici~~nt of the interaction variable at Dt2 is greater than at Dn, 
this means that lot size price is getting higher as time passes and this is 
due to the c:onstraint on land supply created by the UGB. That is, the 
higher the c:oefficient, the higher the effect of the UGB. 
Further, since the UGB encompassed the developable land and 
made it finite until the1 year 2000, housing choice becomes constrained 
as time progresses. As mentioned in the third hypothesis, houses 
located on large lots: become more appreciated and hence more 
expensive a!p they become more scarce. Again, as time passes, more of 
this housing type is consumed. In order to analyze the relationship 
between UGB on lot size, this research interacted the time variable 
and a dummy variable which distinguished between houses located 
on large an~i small lots1. 
The l)GB should have no effect on house improvements, and 
therefore as time passes, house improvements should remain 
constant. However, in order to control for appreciation in housing 
improveme\1ts that lis occurring from other factors, such as 
construction. materials,1labor force, and higher building standards, the 
time variab\e was interacted with the house improvements variable 
(interior square footage). In sum, the two types of interactions- time 
with lot si:ze and time with lot quantity- shed light on the 
relationship between the UGB an~_housing_P!.ices.:__ 
Based on the above discussion, hedonic price estimation is 
utilized to tE.~st the model (which will utilize an ordinary least-squares 
estimate to obtain the regression coefficients and their level of 
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significance) and show the implicit price of property characteristics, 
including the imposition of UGBs. The implicit price estimates the 
dollar value of each attr~bute including those re:lated to the UGBs. 
The equation is derived from a model specified for the study and 
states: 
P= a+bl (UGB)-b2(INTRA TE)+b3(BATH)-b4(AGE)+b5(SQF~)+b6(BED) 
+b7(LOTSIZE)+b8(FIREPLAC)+b9{GARAGE)-blO{CRIME) 
+bll (EDUCA T)+b12(LOT AMT)-b13(DCBD)-b 14(DEMP)-b15(DSCH) 
-b16(DHWYS)-b17(DUGB)-b18(DREC)+b19{TIME) I 
+b20(TIME*LOTSIZE)+b21{TIME*SQFT)+b22{TIME*LO!T AMT) 
+b23(W APOP)+b24(REGPOP)+b25(0RPOP)+ ~>26(W AINC) 
+b27(REGINC)+b28(0RINC)+b29(INCOME) 
where: 
p 
UGB 
INTRATE 
BATH 
AGE 
SQFT 
LOTSIZE 
BED 
FIREPLAC 
GARAGE 
LOTAMT 
is the selling price of the house 
is a dummy variable =1 if house was solei after in 
October 1980, when the UGB was aqopted 
is mortgage interest rate 
is number of bathrooms in the house 
is the age of the house in years at the time of the sale 
is interior square footage of the hoqse 
is lot size of the house in square feet 
is number of bedrooms in the how:\e 
is number of fireplaces in the hous!.~ 
is number of garage spaces in the hpuse 
is <!___ durn!"D.Y_yariable = 1 if house Is located ! on 12,800 
sq.ft. or more 
------------ -----
CRIME 
EDUCAT 
DCBD 
DEMP 
DSCH 
DHWYS 
DUGB 
DREC 
TIME 
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is the aggregated number of burglaries, motor vehicle 
theft, and vandalism (in Washington County) 
is level of ~ducation of neighborhood residents 
is distance of a house from the CBD in feet 
is distance of a house from nearest employment center 
in feet 
is distance of a house from nearest elementary school 
in feet 
is distance of a house from nearest major freeway in 
feet 
is distance of a house from UGB in feet 
is distance of a house from nearest park in feet 
is the time in months from January 1978 (1) to 
December 1990 (156) 
TIME*LOTSIZE is the interaction between time index and lot size 
TIME*SQFT is the interaction between time index and square 
footage of the house 
TIME*LOT AM is the interaction between the time index and the 
dummy variable of the size of the parcel whether large 
or small 
WAPOP 
REG POP 
ORPOP 
WAINC 
REG INC 
is Washington County's population for the year the 
house sold 
is the Portland metropolitan area's population for the 
year the house sold 
is Oregon's population for the year the house sold 
is Washington County's per capita income for the year 
the b..ous.e .. s..cl!=.L_. -· ··--------·· . 
is the Portland metropolitan area's per capita income 
for the year the house sold 
ORINC 
INCOME 
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is Oregon's per capita income for the year the house 
sold 
is the median level of income of neighborhood 
residents 
This model has been used to test all of the hypotheses. 
However, in order to test for the second hypothesis, the sales prices for 
the houses that were sold after the adoption of the UGB were classified 
into four periods, from October 1980 to December 1982, from January 
1983 to December 1985, from January 1986 to December 1987, and from 
January 1988 to December 1990, and each period was regressed 
separately. The notion behind the above classification, is to separate 
the effect of the depression that occurred in the Portland housing 
market during the period between 1982 and 1985, and the periods 
preceding and following it. The period from 1986 to 1987, although 
not in depression was still lower and did not reach the 1982 levels 
again until 1988. 
In more detail, median home prices for the period 1982-1985 
decreased at a rate faster than that of personal income while median 
home prices for the period 1985-1990 increased at a rate faster than that 
of personal income (Toulan 1994). Impact fees in Washington County 
were adopted in October 1990 and in order to isolate the effect of these 
fees on housing prices it would be wise to stop the post testing period 
in this month rather than adding a dummy variable for houses sold 
after this period. The ten years after the adoption of the UGB, which 
includes the depression and prosperity markets, are enough for the 
purpose of this stu_dy_.__h..D.QtheDeason fQ_L_~_tQpping the testing in 1990 
is the introduction shortly after of Measure 5- the property tax 
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limitation measure- which most 1 probably had a major effect on the 
housing market. 
The model analyzes several relationships. First, the 
relationship between the UGB and housing prices was found by 
estimating UGB. Time-series estimation indicated the change in 
housing prices during each of the four periods. Second, the effect of 
proximity to UGBs was figured lby estimating DUGB. Third, the 
relationship between UGBs and the price of housing located on large 
parcels was tested by estimating TIME*LOTAMT. Fourth, the 
coefficient of the TIME*LOTSIZE interaction was used to calculate and 
test the relationship of the UGB. Finally, the coefficients of 
TIME*LOTSIZE and TIME*SQFT wk~re utilized to calculate for the real 
implicit price trends per month due to lot size and house 
improvements. 
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND DATA SOURCES 
The type of data collected fo11 operationalizing the association of 
dependent and independent variables are indicated below. 
The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study measures the sales price of 
individual homes in Washington County before and after the 
adoption of the Portland metropolitan area's UGB. This UGB was 
adopted in October 1980; thus the sitmple consists of time-series data as 
a sample of all single-family hornes sold in Washington County 
between January 1978 and December 1990. 
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The Independent Variables 
The study measures the following independent variables which 
were associated with the:: sale prices of homes in the Washington 
County: 
Supply-Demand Variables 
INTRA TE Mortgage interest rate is measured in percentage 
UGB If a house sold after the UGB was adopted in October 
1980 it will get the number 1, and 0 if before 
WAPOP 
REG POP 
ORPOP 
WAINC 
REG INC 
ORINC 
Washington County's population during the year the 
house was sold 
The Portland metropolitan area's population during 
the year the house was sold 
Oregon's population during the year the house was 
sold 
Washington County's per capita income during the 
year the house was sold 
The Portland metropolitan area's per capita income 
during the year the house was sold 
Oregon's per capita income during the year the house 
was sold 
Accessibility Variables 
DCBD Straight line distance (in feet) between the CBD and 
site of the house sold. 
DEMP Straight line distance (in feet) between the nearest 
emP-Joym~!l_L~ent~!'_iind _gt~QJ the___house sale. Based 
on the analysis of economic and service activities and 
employment intensity, five locations were selected as 
DSCH 
DHWY 
DUGB 
DREC 
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employment centers in Washington County (see 
Figure 9) 
Straight liue distance (in feet) between the nearest local 
elementary school and site of the house sold 
Straight line distance (in feet) between nearest highway 
and site of the house sold. This research used the three 
major highways, 1-5, SR-26, and 1-217 
Straight line distance (in feet) between the UGB and 
site of the house sold. 
Straight line distance (in feet) between the nearest 
public park and site of the house sold 
All distance measurements were calculated utilizing GIS 
software. 
Structure and Site Variables 
BATH 
AGE 
SQFT 
LOTSIZE 
BED 
FIREPLAC 
GARAGE 
LOTAMT 
Number of bathrooms in the house at time of sale 
Age of the house in years at time of sale 
Interior square footage of the house at time of sale 
Lot size of the house in square feet at time of sale 
Number of bedrooms in the house at time of sale 
Number of fireplaces in the house at time of sale 
Number of garage spaces in the house at time of sale 
Distinguishes between houses located on large parcels. 
If a house is located on a parcel less than 12,800 square 
feet, it is considered to be small and 0 was assigned. 
The 12,800 square feet was_dlQ_~~D. l:Je_cause this was the 
average size of the zoned single-family residential 
before the adoption of the UGB and after until 1982 
• Employment Center 
/\1 Freeways 
• 
·o Washington couniy 
Urban Growth Boundary 
• 
• 
Figure 9. Washington County map with Urban Growth Boundary. 0\ U1 
TIME* 
LOTSIZE 
TIME* 
SQFT 
TIME* 
LOTAMT 
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This interaction between the time index variable and 
the lot size variable of the size of the parcel allowed for 
the distinction of the effect of UGB on lot size 
This interaction between the time index variable and 
the square footage variable allowed for the control of 
appreciation that would occur due to factors such as 
construction material market, labor force, and higher 
building standards 
This interaction between the time index variable and 
the lot amount dummy variable of the size of the 
parcel whether large or small allowed for the 
distinction of the effect of UGB on large and small 
parcels 
Neighborhood Variables 
CRIME Number of crimes in Washington County during the 
year the house was sold. This is the aggregated 
number of burglaries, motor vehicle theft, and 
vandalism. According to Arlene Wittmayer and Mary 
Nunnenkamp at the Washington County Sheriff's 
Department, these three crime types are the ones that 
concern homebuyers the most. They tend to affect 
neighborhood security because they are perpetuated by 
strangers while other crimes such as murder are 
perpetuated by relatives or known people. 
EDUCAT Level of education, years of education, of 
neighborhood res~gent~__}yh.e_r:e __ Jhe. sold house is 
located. In particular, the level of education in each 
census tract of a particular house was reported. All 
INCOME 
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houses which were sold between January 1978 and 
June 1985 used the 1980 Census, and all houses sold 
between Ju.ly 1985 and December 1990 used the 1990 
Census 
Level of income of neighborhood residents, mean 
average, where the sold house is located. In particular, 
the level of education in each census tract of a 
particular house was reported. All houses which were 
sold between January 1978 and June 1985 used the 1980 
Census, and all houses sold between July 1985 and 
December 1990 used the 1990 Census 
Inflation Control Variable 
TIME 
Data Sources 
Since this research is using time-series data, inflation 
in housing prices is a concern. The time variable 
controls for inflation. It is measured in months with 1 
being the first month, January 1978, through 156, being 
the last month, December 1990 
Data for the dependent variable (sale prices) for 46,400 homes 
sold in Washington County, Oregon, between January 1978 and 
December 1990 was obtaiPed from the Department of Assessment and 
Taxation in Hillsboro, Oregon. For the independent variables, data for 
interest rates was obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletins. 
Population and per capita income variables were obtained from the 
Center for Population Research_and_~~nsus_~t Portland State 
University. The structural and site independent variables were 
obtained from the Department of Assessment and Taxation in 
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Hillsboro. The three neighborhood independent variables were 
obtained from two different sources. The education and income levels 
of the neighborhood residents were obtained from the Center for 
Population Research and Census at Portland State University while 
the crime rate was obtained from the Analysis of Crime in Oregon 
Reports. Finally, the distance variables were computed utilizing GIS 
software. 
For the purpose of testing the hypotheses raised in this research, 
the homes sold in Washington County were stratified according to 
two criteria, first, according to their selling date, and second, according 
to their prices. The notion behind stratification according to price 
values was to maintain representation of each stratum. Based on the 
two classification criterion, a total sample of 2269 homes was selected 
for the period between 1978-1990. Out of this sample, 335 homes were 
for the period before the implementation of the UGB Oanuary 1978 
and October 1980). The samples for the periods after the 
implementation of the UGB consisted of 178 homes for the period 
between November 1980 and December 1982, 400 homes for the period 
between January 1983 and December 1985, 459 homes for the period 
between January 1986 and December 1987, and 897 homes for the 
period between January 1988 and December 1990. Each of the above 
samples contained at least 5 percent of the homes in each sample sold 
for at the following price levels: $50,000 or less, $50,001-$100,000, 
$100,001-$150,000, $150,001-$200,000, and $200,001 or more. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The scope of this chapter is to present a descriptive analysis of 
the research data and the research findings. The exploration is in four 
sections. The first section explains the housing market in the study 
area during the period between 1978 and 1990. The data described 
below concerns the sold houses and does not differentiate between old 
and newly constructed houses. The second section presents the model 
refinement. The third section describes and interprets the findings of 
the research regarding the hypotheses. The fourth section presents a 
summary of the major findings of this research. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
During the period studied, the analysis showed different 
behaviors in the housing market. The average price of a house during 
the period between 1978 and 1990 was found to be $80,398. This 
number was almost one eighth less prior to the imposition of the 
UGB, while after the implementation this number fluctuated between 
1980 and 1990. As shown in Figure 10, the average price for a house 
was $79,515, $73,168, $74,886, and $90,237 in 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-
1987, and 1988-1990 respectively. 
The average lot size almost took a pattern of a zigzag form. The 
average size before implementation_ ()f theJ)_§_~ was_11,214 square feet. 
During the period 1980 and 1982, which is immediately after the UGB 
was implemented, the average lot size for a house was 9,255 square 
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foot. However, following this period, the sample for the period 
between 1983 and 1985 showed an average lot size of a house was 
11,697 square feet. As shuwn in Figure 11, the average lot size kept 
going up and down during the different periods. 
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Figure 10. Average Price for Single-Family Dwellings Sold, 
1978-1990. 
The behavior of the average interior square footage of a house 
was different from the average prices and average lot sizes during the 
studied period. Except for the period before the implementation of the 
UGB, the average interior square footage of a house kept increasing 
but at different rates. As shown in Figure 12, the average interior 
---------------·----· 
square footage of a house was 1,702, 1,756, 1,777, and 1,816 square feet 
between 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1987, and 1988-1990 respectively. 
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Figure 11. Average Lot Size for Single-Family Dwellings Sold, 
1978-1990. 
MODEL REFINEMENT 
Prior to discussing the results of each hypothesis, it is important 
to mention that due to the high multicollinearity between the 
variables LOTSIZE and the interaction between TIME*LOTSIZE 
(R=0.987), SQFT and the interaction between TIME*SQFT (R=0.662), 
and TIME and the interaction between TIME*SQFT (R=0.727), the 
variables of LOTSIZE and SQFT were eliminated from the regression 
equations. Further, LOTAMT and TIME*LOTAMT were highly 
correlated (0.902), and so LOTAMT was eliminated from the 
regression equations, too. 
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Figure 12. Average; Interior Square Footage for Single-Family 
Dwellings Sold, 1978-1990. 
This research tri!O'd to include other variables that are important 
to housing market behpvio'r, but due to the high multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation they al~o had to be excluded. The variable of regional 
population plays a very significant role in housing prices changes. 
This study uses time-series 1data and the time index was an important 
variable to be includep in the model specification. Unfortunately, 
time and population here found to be highly correlated (R=0.970); 
therefore the populatipn wariable was excluded from the regression 
---------------·----· 
equation. The study wenlt further and tried to include population 
variables at the state r.nd 1 county levels. The high autocorrelation 
between time and state population (R=0.922) and time and county 
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population (R=0.978) led to the exclusion of the population variable at 
state and county levels. 
Regional income is another important variable that can 
influence housing market behavior. This study did obtain a regional 
per capita income variable and tested for this variable, but the high 
autocorrelation between this variable and the time index variable 
(R=0.942) forced the study to exclude the regional per capita income 
variable. The study went further and tried to include per capita 
income variable at state and county levels. Unfortunately, there was 
also high autocorrelation between time and state per capita income 
(R=0.949)) and time and county per capita income (R=0.950), and so per 
capita income at the state and county levels were also excluded from 
the regression model. The final model, therefore, included only the 
variables listed in Table I. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings of the research hypotheses are presented here in 
three sections. The first section discusses the analysis of the 
relationship between UGBs and rate of increase in housing prices. 
The second section discusses the relationship between UGBs and rate 
of increase in housing prices as the designated periods for UGBs get 
closer. The third section analyses the relationship between UGBs and 
housing prices, differentiating between large and small lots. 
UGBs AND RATE OF INCREASE IN HOUSING PRICES 
-------------------· 
The empirical analysis of the first hypothesis reveals several 
results as shown in Table I. The regression shows that all the 
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independent variables jointly explain 53 percent of all the variation in 
sale prices of homes sold before and after the implementation of the 
UGB. Contrary to the expected sign being positive, the UGB coefficient 
appears to be negative and significant at least at the .01 level. This 
coefficient suggests that after the implementation of the UGB, housing 
prices decreased by about $20,583. Although this finding is contrary to 
what was expected, there are reasons for why UGBs would be 
associated with lower housing prices. Some scholars (Peiser 1989) 
argue that UGBs lead to an increase in densities, which would in turn 
lead to lower housing prices. It is also argued that UGBs make 
services and utilities more efficient and the savings from this 
increased efficiency would be reflected in lower housing prices. 
Further, those scholars argue that UGBs clarify goals and vision and 
guarantee future development, which in turn shortens 
administrative procedures and time (Lowry 1992). 
It is very important to recognize also that the implementation 
of the Metropolitan Housing Rule (MHR) in 1981 could have caused 
housing prices to go down. It is difficult to isolate the effect of UGB as 
opposed to the MHR, since both policies took place almost at the same 
time. Moreover, the instability in the economy during the early 1980s 
could also have caused housing prices to decline. 
Consequently, this research goes further and divides housing 
data for the full period 1978-1990 into two groups, one before the 
implementation of the UGB, between the period of January 1978 and 
October 1980, and the other after the implementation of the UGB, 
between the period of November 1980 and December 1990. These two 
groups were analyzed using regre.ssion JilQ_d~l?· _The results were 
compared to the results of the full period (before and after the 
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implementation of the UGB), and the UGB variable was eliminated to 
allow for perfect comparison. Table II shows the regression results. 
TABLE I 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR PRICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SAMPLE 
PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE UGB) 
Variable Coefficient T-Score 
UGB -20583 -8.4*** 
AGE -290 -7.2*** 
BEDROOM 1781 2.1** 
BATHROOM 7836 7.8*** 
GARAGE 3312 1.9* 
FIREPLACE 551 0.6 
INTRATE 3653 8.1 *** 
DCBD -0.23 -4.5*** 
DSCH 1.39 3.7**'" 
DUGB -0.68 -4.8*** 
DREC 0.57 1.6* 
DHWYS -0.28 -2.9*** 
DEMP -0.11 -1.2* 
CRIME -8370 -4.9*** 
EDUCATION 1.5 1.4* 
TIME -18.1 -0.6 
TIME*LOTSIZE 0.0015 3.5*** 
TIME"SQFT 0.207 22.7*** 
Constant 34866 3.9*** 
Multiple R2 0.53 
Sample Size 2269 
.. Sigmficant at 0.05 level (one-tmled) 
Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
* 
** 
The regression results show that all the independent variables 
jointly explained 52, 62, and 53 percent of the variation in sale prices of 
homes sold before and after, on!y before, Hand only after the 
implementation of the UGB, respectively. 
TABLE II 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR PRICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SAMPLE 
PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE UGB) 
Variable Before-After UGB Before UGB 
Coeff. T-Score Coeff. 
AGE -287 -7.0*** -140 
BEDROOM 1754 2.0** 149 
BATHROOM 7695 7.6*** 11589 
GARAGE 3001 1.7* 1741 
FIREPLACE 502 0.5 -1628 
INTRATE 1884 4.6*** -430 
DCBD -0.23 -4.4*** -0.11 
DSCH 1.3 3.5*** 0.6 
DUGB -0.67 -4.7*** -0.50 
DREC 0.61 1.7* 0.39 
DHWYS -0.26 -2.7*** -0.43 
DEMP -0.09 -1.0* 0.25 
CRIME -6560 -3.8*** -1240 
EDUCATION 1.5 1.4* 1.8 
TIME -188 -8.7*** -461 
TIME*LOTSIZE 0.0015 3.6*** 0.013 
TIME*SQFT 0.207 22.4*** 0.547 
Constant 48478 5.5*** 51125 
Multiple R2 0.52 0.62 
Sample Size 2269 335 
.. Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
** 
T-Score 
-1.9* 
0.1 
6.9*** 
0.6 
-0.9 
-0.3 
-1.4* 
0.3 
-2.1** 
0.6 
-2.9*** 
1.6 
-0.5 
1.1* 
-1.4 
6.0*** 
6.6*** 
3.3*** 
After UGB 
Coeff. T-Score 
-341 -7.6*** 
1222 1.2* 
6277 5.5*** 
3820 1.9* 
726 0.7 
4454 5.7*** 
-0.23 -4.0*** 
1.3 3.3*** 
-0.65 -4.1*** 
0.64 1.6* 
-0.27 -2.5*** 
-0.15 -1.5* 
-10326 -3.4*** 
0.87 0.6 
11 0.3 
0.0013 2.9*** 
0.217 21.9*** 
11892 0.7 
0.53 
1934 
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Comparing the three regressions, it is obvious that some 
variables became significant after the implementation of the UGB 
while others did not. Although the coefficients of DUGB are 
significant before and after the implementation of the UGB at a level 
of .05 and .01, respectively, the coefficient after the implementation of 
the UGB is higher than before the UGB was implemented, a finding 
which is consistent with the theoretical literature (Correll et al. 1978; 
Nelson 1984). In particular, the coefficients of DUGB suggest that a 
house close to the UGB after it was implemented will lose $0.65 for 
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every foot of distance from the UGB while the value before the 
implementation was $0.50 for every foot of distance. It must be kept in 
mind, however, that the period after the UGB was implemented 
experienced a severe depression. Thus, the $0.65 could be 
underestimated. When looking to the rate of increase it is clear that a 
house sold after the UGB was implemented captured a higher rate of 
increase, but it is not that high compared to the rate of increase before 
the UGB was implemented. In particular, due to DUGB, a house after 
the UGB was implemented captured 0.00080 percent of the house 
value for every single foot it gets closer to the UGB versus 0.00071 
before the UGB was implemented. 
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the DUGB before the 
implementation of the UGB was significantly sizable, due to the fact that 
participants in the land market feared a stringent UGB and its 
consequences and were unsure of the final lines of the UGB, drafted 
before October 1980. In fact, the date of line demarcation goes back to 1977 
and that is how Knaap (1982) found some effects of the UGB on land 
values when he studied the Portland metropolitan area. 
Based on the coefficients of the two interactions, 
TIME*LOTSIZE and TIME*SQFT, as shown in Table II, the real 
implicit price trends in house value can be calculated for each period. 
The coefficients of the interactions show the price increment of one 
square foot in LOTSIZE and SQFT. Multiplying these coefficients with 
the average size of LOTSIZE and SQFT in a certain period would 
reveal the real implicit price of an average LOTSIZE per month, as the 
TIME variable was measured in a one-month increment. In 
particular, the average LOTSIZE _Q_tJring_the __ J>erio_d after UGB was 
11,827 square feet. Multiplying the coefficient outcome for the same 
variable during the same period reveals $15. This is the increment in 
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LOTSIZE per month. In order to measure the rate of the increase in 
LOTSIZE price, the real implicit price of an average LOTSIZE per 
month was divided by the average house price (Table III). 
Table III and Figure 13 show that the value of a house was 
lower in its LOTSIZE value after the implementation of the UGB than 
before. In particular, LOTSIZE appreciated by only 0.02 percent of the 
house value after the UGB was implemented while the appreciation 
before the UGB was implemented was 0.20 percent. In fact, this 
should be the opposite, as the argument is that the increased rate in 
housing prices is higher after the UGB was implemented. However, 
the outcomes of the SQFT suggests that there must be other factors 
that are affecting the housing market which are not accounted for. 
The results reveal that the value of a house is lower in its SQFT 
value after implementation of the UGB than before, 0.47 percent after 
implementation as opposed to 1.32 percent before implementation. 
Since the UGB is mainly concerned with land supply, the SQFT value 
should not be affected, as the model controlled for other factors. 
However, the reduction in the values of LOTSIZE and SQFT after 
implementation of the UGB stresses the necessity for further analysis 
about the period following the implementation. The next section 
deals with this issue. 
TABLE III 
REAL IMPLICIT PRICE TRENDS (IN $) PER MONTH DUE TO LOT SIZE AND 
HOUSE IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE PERIODS BEFORE AND AFTER THE UGB 
Before-After UGB Before UGB After UGB 
Value percent Value p_erce11L Value percent 
TOTAL 386 0.47 1082 0.52 402 0.49 
LOTSIZE 18 0.02 146 0.20 15 0.02 
SQFT 367 0.45 936 1.32 387 0.47 
1.4 
t.IJ 
~ 1 
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REAL IMPLICIT PRICE TRENDS 
BEFORE-AFTER BEFORE AFTER 
PERIOD 
I[] TOTAL Ill LOTSIZE D SQFT I 
Figure 13. Real Implicit Price Trends per Month Due to Lot Size 
and House Improvements for the Periods Before and After the 
UGB. 
In short, the reduction in the LOTSIZE coefficient value after 
implementation could be attributed to three factors: first, the 
association of the UGB with the MHR, which could have caused land 
values to go down; second, the recession which hit the Portland 
economy in the early 1980s; third, the fear of a stringent UGB, with 
resultant immediate land acquisition from within the drafted UGB 
market. 
This is supported by Lillydahl and Singell {1987) when they 
argue that even if growth controls are not actually in effect, if the city 
leaders favor such controls or if residents anticipate the enactment of 
such controls, prices may increase in anticipation of these controls. 
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Thus, after the UGB was implemented, the ambiguity went away and 
prices came down. Even with this explanation for a reduction in the 
LOTSIZE coefficient value after the implementation of the UGB, a 
house would increase by $180 a year. 
However, the analysis shows that AGE, BATHROOM, DCBD, 
and DHWYS remain significant in the two regressions, before and 
after the UGB, while the coefficients of GARAGE, BEDROOM, 
INTRAT, DSCH, DREC, DEMP, and CRIME become significant only 
after the period of UGB implementation as opposed to before. The 
level of significance varies between slight significance at the level of 
0.05 (one-tailed) to highly significant at the level of 0.01 (two-tailed). 
In particular, the DCBD coefficient suggests that a house would lose 
$0.11 during the period before UGB implementation, and $0.23 during 
the period after implementation, for every foot of distance from the 
CBD. This reveals a downward sloping gradient of 0.82 and 1.5 percent 
per mile, before and after the UGB, respectively. In fact, the latter is 
close to what was reported by Mills and Hamilton (1989). In addition, 
the coefficients of the DHWYS were found to be significant at the level 
of 0.01 (two-tailed) but the value dropped in the period after the UGB 
was implemented. 
Although the coefficient of DSCH, after UGB implementation, 
is significant at least at the .01 level, it carries a different sign than 
expected. The coefficient suggests that the price of a house will 
increase by $1.3 for every foot of distance from elementary schools as 
some people see proximity to elementary schools as a negative. 
However, the direction of the sign could change from time to time 
and from location to location depepding_Q_I]_Jh~ b~h.f.lvioral changes of 
the people involved. It is interesting, when looking at both 
regressions analyzing the housing market before and after UGB 
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implementation, to note that only FIREPLACE and TIME coefficients 
are not significant. 
Nevertheless, the opposite sign stimulated further research in 
an effort to explain this outcome. One possible reason could be that 
most of the houses in the studied sample are occupied by people with 
few or no children and those homes would have a small number of 
bedrooms. One way to test this is by interacting the DSCH variable 
with BEDROOM. This research did created an interaction between 
these two variables but did not find it to be significant. The other 
possible reason is that people like to stay away from schools with low 
quality. Interacting school quality with DSCH allow for an analysis of 
the relationship between school quality and school distance. 
However, this study was not able to find data about school quality; 
therefore, it was difficult to test this relationship. 
Support for the suspicion that the price functions of the two 
periods, before and after, are not similar is indicated by a Chow-test F-
ratio, which is significant at 0.01 level and results in rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 
RATE OF INCREASE IN HOUSING PRICES 
IN THE LATTER PERIODS 
As discussed in Chapter III, in order to test for higher land 
values and housing prices as UGBs get closer to the end of their 
designated periods, the period after UGB implementation has been 
divided into four sub-periods and in turn four regressions have been 
utilized. As shown in Table IV, the coeW~t~nts oi all the variables 
fluctuated up and down. It is obvious from the results that the period 
between 1983-1985 witnessed a drop in most of the coefficients 
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compared to the preceding and following periqds. In fatt, this is not 
unexpected, as the results are consistent with the depression that 
occurred in the Portland ~lousing market duri1;1g the period between 
1983-1985. 
TABLE IV 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR PRICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SAMPLE 
PERIOD AFTER THE UGB) I 
Variable 1980-1982 1983-1985 
Coef. T-Score Coef. T-Score 
AGE -442 -2.1** -160 -1.6* 
BEDROOM -3308 -0.8 7194 3.1*** 
BATHROOM 15800 3.1*** 4280 1.7* 
GARAGE -10106 -1.2 3077 0.7 
FIREPLACE 3107 0.7 2058 0.8 
INTRATE -2155 -0.6 2459 0.6 
DCBD 0.09 0.3 -0.17 -1.4* 
DSCH 2.4 1.4* 0.6 0.7 
DUGB 0.1 0.2 -0.35 -0.9 
DREC -0.9 -0.6 O.Dl 0.01 
DHWYS -0.09 -0.2 -0.07 -0.2 
DEMP 0.003 0.00 0.004 0.01 
CRIME -25861 -0.8 -103321 -2.0** 
EDUCATION -0.1 -0.03 -0.9 -0.3 
TIME -945 -1.2 67.4 0.2 
TIME*LOTSIZE 0.009 0.8 -0.002 -2.4*** 
TIME*SQFT 0.465 4.7••• 0.224 7.1*** 
Constant 146284 1.4* 189726 2.3** 
Multiple R2 0.50 0.41 
Sample Size 178 400 
.. Significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
••• Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
* 
•• 
1986-1987 
Coef. T-Score 
-29$ -2.9*** 
689() 3.2*** 
646$ 2.7*** 
353,5 0.7 
-2194 -1.0 
6537 0.9 
-0.3 -2.4 .... 
0.6 0.7 
-0.8~~ -2.8*** 
0.54 0.6 
-0.28 -1.3* 
-0.1 -0.6 
-1947 -0.04 
5.3 1.8* 
371 0.8 
0.00~ 2.4*** 
0.16;~ 7.6*** 
-7341)4 -0.5 
0.47 
459 
1988-1990 
Coef. T-Score 
-488 -8.5*** 
-5261 -3.8*** 
4855 3.1*** 
5586 2.1** 
988 0.7 
-10566 -4.0*** 
-0.26 -3.2*** 
1.2 2.1** 
-0.68 -2.0*** 
1.3 2.4*** 
-0.37 -2.5*** 
0.2 1.4 
-1920 -0.2 
' 
0.5 0.2 
I 768 3.6*** 
I 0.002 4.2*** 
0.252 21.5*** 
45390 1.1* 
I 0.67 
i 897 
However, the four regressions show that all the independent 
variables jointly explained 50, 41, 47, and 67 percent of all the 
variations in sale prices of homes sold after UGB implementation and 
83 
between the periods 1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1987, and 1988-1990, 
respectively. 
The interactive eff~cts of LOTSIZE*TIME and SQFT*TIME are 
consistent with previous theoretical predictions. All of their 
coefficients are significant at least at the .01 level except for 
TIME*LOTSIZE for the period between 1980-1982, which is not 
significant. 
Based on earlier discussion of the coefficients of the two 
interactions TIME*LOTSIZE and TIME*SQFT, the real implicit price 
trends of the price of a house when looking at the components of 
LOTSIZE and SQFT are summarized in Table V and Figure 14. 
LOTSIZE and SQFT fluctuated and SQFT decreased during the two 
periods followed the first one and then picked up. LOTSIZE followed 
a zigzag pattern decreasing and increasing and then decreasing again. 
TABLE V 
REAL IMPLICIT PRICE TRENDS (IN $) PER MONTH DUE TO LOT SIZE AND 
HOUSE IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE PERIODS AFTER THE UGB 
1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1987 1988-1990 
Value % Value % Value o/o Value 0/o 
TOTAL 865 1.09 361 0.49 321 0.42 482 0.53 
LOTSIZE 74 0.09 -32 -0.04 33 0.04 26 0.03 
SQFT 791 1.0 393 0.53 288 0.38 456 0.50 
In particular, during the period between 1983-1985, both 
interactions TIME*LOTSIZE and TIME*SQFT obtained lower 
coefficients compared to the preceding period. Again, this was 
expected due to the depression thafoccurredduring this period. What 
is interesting is that during the period of 1986 and 1987 
TIME*LOTSIZE picked up in its coefficient while TIME*SQFT became 
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worse than the period of the depression. This leads to the necessity for 
further research about the labor and cbnstruction material markets 
during that period. 
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Figure 14. Real Implicit Price Trenids per Month Due to Lot Size 
and House ImprovemE~nts for the Four sub-Periods After the 
UGB. 
The results of the last period, betv.reen 1988-1990, show that the 
coefficients of the two interactions TIMJE*LOTSIZE and TIME*SQFT 
were opposite their values in the previous period. The coefficient of 
TIME*LOTSIZE became low(!r where the coefficient of TIME*SQFT 
became higher. This implies -1hat-H1e---B6-B--had no marked 
relationship with housing prices. 
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The decrease in the LOTSIZE value could be due to less demand 
for land as growth escaped to the neighboring area, Clark County, 
Washington where UGB::; were not in existence. To explore this 
possibility, building permits of the six counties- Clackamas; 
Columbia; Multnomah; Washington; Yamhill; Clark County, 
Washington- which comprise the Portland metropolitan area, were 
analyzed between 1980 and 1990 and the population for the year 1980 
was considered the base year. Figure 15 shows that during the last 
three years, 1988, 1989, and 1990, issuance of building permits in Clark 
County increased so rapidly that by the end of 1990 they surpassed 
Washington County, which had been the county issuing the greatest 
number of building permits between 1980 and 1989. 
In short, growth could have escaped to Clark County during the 
period of 1988 and 1990 and that is why the results show a lower 
coefficient for TIME*LOTSIZE during this period. In fact, seeing the 
growth escaping to Clark County is not surprising and is consistent 
with most of the empirical research (Lillydahl and Singell 1987; 
Chinitz 1990; Landis 1992; Downs 1994; Schwartz et al. 1986). In 
particular, the empirical work of Schwartz et al. (1981) found that 
there was no significant difference in the increase in housing prices in 
Petaluma as compared with Rohnet Park, where growth control was 
not applied, but their study did find that the number of building 
permits increased sharply in Rohnert Park after growth control in 
Petaluma took place. They concluded that where perfect substitution 
exists, growth controls will not increase housing prices in the 
community where the controls are imposed, but they will increase the 
quantity of houses constructed . i.!:L_§J!IIQUndill..g communities. 
However, during the last two periods following the depression, the 
UGB caused housing prices to increase by up to $1,738. This significant 
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increase is enough to hinder the ability of many people to own a 
house. 
CHANGE IN BUILDING PERMITS 
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Figure 15. Changes in Building Permits Issued Between 1980 
and 1990 (population for 1980 was Taken as the Base Year) 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the increase in issuance of 
building permits in Clark County by the end of 1990 could be also due 
to the high property taxes in Oregon as Measure 5, which intended to 
limit property taxes, did not take place not until the 1991-92 fiscal year. 
However, no matter how much the rate of the increase in housing 
prices, the rate of increase atter the-UGBwaslmplemented was lower 
than before the UGB was implemented. 
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Support for the suspicion that the price functions of the four 
sub-periods, after the UGB, are not similar is indicated by a Chow-test 
F-ratio, which is significaitt at 0.05 for the first two sub-periods and at 
0.01 for the last two sub-periods level. This results in rejection of the 
null hypothesis. 
The coefficients of the DCBD and the DUGB kept increasing 
during the first three periods, including the recession period, but the 
coefficients of both variables dropped during the last period. 
However, the coefficients of the DCBD was significant during the last 
three periods while the coefficients of the DUGB were significant only 
during the last two periods. Comparing the downward sloping 
gradient of both DCBD and DUGB related to housing prices, the results 
show that DUGB has a higher downward sloping gradient than DCBD, 
0.7, 2.5, 5.8, and 4.0 percent per mile for DUGB for the first, second, 
third, fourth periods, respectively, 0.6, 1.2, 2.1, and 1.5 percent per mile 
for DCBD for the first, second, third, and fourth periods, respectively. 
Since the emergence of suburban subcenters and multi-centers of 
activities, the importance of proximity to the CBD has decreased and 
this has contributed to the higher gradient percentage of the DUGB 
versus DCBD. Proximity to UGBs is also limited. The other possible 
reason is that most of the houses in Washington County are closer to 
the UGB than to the CBD. 
When looking at the rate of increase due to DUGB, the rate 
during the last period after the UGB was implemented dropped 
significantly compared to the prior period, 0.001094 for the period 
between 1986-1987 and 0.00075 for the period between 1988-1990. In 
fact, the rate of the last period W£1S alm,Q.~.L~il11ilf!r to the rate of 
increase during the period before the UGB was implemented which 
was 0.00071. 
RATE OF PRICE INCREASES OF SINGLE-FAMILY HOUSES ON 
LARGER LOTS 
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One of the hypotheses that has been raised in this research 
states that houses located on large lots, 12800 feet and above, would 
capture higher rates in prices compared to houses located on lots 
smaller than this. This could be due to the limited supply of raw land 
because of UGB imposition. 
The regression models reveal several results. As shown in 
Table VI, all the independent variables jointly explained 52 percent, 60 
percent, and 53 percent for the periods before-after, before, and after 
the UGB was implemented, respectively. 
Table VI shows that the coefficients of TIME*LOTAMT dropped 
after the imposition of the UGB. In particular, the rate was 0.71 
percent before the UGB was implemented while it was 0.10 percent 
after. Again, this is due to the fluctuation of the economy during the 
period after the UGB was implemented. This is clear, as the results 
reveal the same drop in the coefficient of the TIME*SQFT variable; it 
is unusual for the value of the area of interior footage of a house to 
drop as a result of the UGB when most of the related variables are 
accounted for. 
However, the results of the period after UGB imolementation 
and after the division into the four periods as discussed give a clear 
picture about the rate of increase after the UGB was implemented. 
Table VII shows the four regression results which tested for the four 
periods after the TJGB was imr-~_mente_d., ___ AlLJhe independent 
variables jointly explained 49, 41, 47, and 67 percent for the periods 
1980-1982, 1983-1985, 1986-1987, and 1988-1990, respectively. 
TABLE VI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR PRICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SAMPLE 
PERIOD BEFORE AND AFTER THE UGB) 
Variable Before-After UGB Before UGB 
Coeff. T-Score Coeff. 
AGE -323 -7.7*** -173 
BEDROOM 1849 2.1** 620 
BATHROOM 7587 7.5*** 10512 
GARAGE 2630 1.4* 2280 
FIREPLACE 513 0.5 -296 
INTRATE 1915 4.7*** -1345 
DCBD -0.22 -4.2*** -0.13 
DSCH 1.2 3.3*** 1.3 
DUGB -0.67 -4.7*** -0.62 
DREC 0.48 1.3* 0.33 
DHWYS -0.26 -2.7*** -0.43 
DEMP -0.1 -1.1 * 0.17 
CRIME -6464 -3.7*** -2841 
EDUCATION 1.7 ! 1.5* 1.5 
TIME -173 -8.0*** -203 
TIME* LOT ANfT 75 I 5.3*** 506 
TIME*SQFT 0.204 22.1*** 0.587 
Constant 48302 5.5*** 61092 
Multiple R2 0.52 0.60 
Sarnele Size 2269 335 
. ' .. S1gmficant at 0.05 level (one-tailed) 
Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
*** Significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed) 
** 
T-Score 
-2.2** 
0.4 
6.1 *** 
0.8 
-0.1 
-0.9 
-1.5* 
1.9* 
-2.5** 
0.5 
-2.8*** 
1.2* 
-1.2* 
0.9 
-0.6 
4.3*** 
6.9*** 
3.8*** 
After UGB 
Coeff. T-Score 
-390 -8.5*** 
1335 1.3* 
6229 5.5*** 
3320 1.6* 
686 0.7 
4644 6.0*** 
-0.22 -3.8*** 
1.2 3.0*** 
-0.63 -4.0*** 
0.48 1.2* 
-0.27 -2.5*** 
-0.16 -1.5* 
-9765 -3.2*** 
1.1 0.8 
34 0.9 
77 5.3*** 
0.211 21.5*** 
8014 0.4 
0.53 
1934 
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The coefficients for TIME*LOTAMT, the interaction variable, 
are significant during the three periods following 1982, and, in fact, for 
these three periods, the level of significance went up as time 
proceeded, to the .05 level (one-tail), .05 level (two-tail), and 0.01 level 
(two-tail), re~pectively. i The magnitudes of the coefficients also 
increased as Hme pasc::ed A honse ~~ a---largeHlot-during 1983-1985 
captured $58 per month, $66 per month during 1986-1987, and $75 per 
month during 1988-1990; This implies that larger lots got more scarce 
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as time passed especially since the UGB prevented any inclusion of 
raw land since October 1980. Further details show that a house located 
on a large lot captured att increase of $6,372 between 1983 and 1990. 
However, when looking at the rate of the increase in LOTAMT price, 
the analysis shows that the rate was increasing until the last period, 
where the rate dropped. In particular, the rate was 0.025, 0.079, 0.088, 
and 0.083 percent, respectively. 
TABLE VII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR PRICE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE (SAMPLE 
PERIOD AFTER THE UGB WAS IMPLEMENTED) 
Variable 1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1987 
Coef. T-Score Coef. T-Score Coef. T-Score 
AGE -390 -1.8* -216 -2.1" -293 -2.8*** 
BEDROOM -3127 -0.8 8005 3.5*** 7115 3.3*** 
BATHROOM 15922 3.1 *** 4514 1.8* 6743 2.8*** 
GARAGE -9105 -1.1 2150 0.5 5137 1.1* 
FIREPLACE 3358 0.8 1226 0.5 -2054 -0.9 
INTRATE -2334 -0.7 1925 0.4 6816 0.9 
DCBD 0.08 0.3 -0.21 -1.6* -0.3 -2.3** 
DSCH 2.7 1.6* 0.03 O.Q3 0.6 0.7 
DUGB 0.1 0.1 -0.35 -0.9 -0.8 -2.7*** 
DREC -0.9 -0.6 0.14 0.16 0.59 0.7 
DHWYS -0.1 -0.2 -0.07 -0.3 -0.27 -1.2* 
DEMP -0.001 -0.00 0.05 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 
CRIME -23783 -0.7 -104495 -2.0** -1269 -0.02 
EDUCATION -0.4 -0.09 -0.9 -0.3 5.1 1.7* 
TIME -822 -1.1 81 0.2 417 0.9 
TIME*LOT AMT 20 0.1 58 1.3* 66 2.2** 
TIME*SQFT 0.481 4.8*** 0.179 6.0*** 0.159 7.4*** 
Constant 139224 1.4* 203406 2.4*** -83479 -0.5 
Multiple R2 0.49 0.41 0.47 
Sample Size 178 400 459 
* 
.. 
** 
Sigmficant at 0.05 level (one-tmled) 
Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed) 
*** Significant at o~oriev·er (two=tailed) _________ . 
1988-1990 
Coef. T-Score 
-529 -8.9*** 
-4814 -3.5*** 
4276 2.8"** 
4801 1.8* 
835 0.6 
-10200 -3.9*** 
-0.24 -3.1 **" 
1.1 2.0** 
-0.72 -3.2*** 
1.1 2.0** 
-0.39 -2.7*** 
0.2 1.5 
-130 -0.01 
0.5 0.3 
811 3.8*** 
75 4.5*** 
0.250 21.4*** 
35436 0.9 
0.67 
897 
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SUMMARY 
By exploring the relationship between housing prices and the 
UGB, it was found that the UGB did not affect housing prices. In 
particular, the increased rate in the value of the LOTSIZE was much 
lower during the period after the UGB was implemented compared to 
the period before the UGB. 
In addition, during the period after the UGB was implemented, 
the rate of increase in lot size is almost flat. This low rate could be 
attributed to the ample amount of land supplied within the UGB as 
this analysis studied only up to the midpoint of the designated period. 
The analysis showed an overall increase in the rates of the 
value of LOTAMT during the three periods following the UGB 
implementation, while the rate decreased at the fourth period. Large 
lots did capture higher values as time passed compared to small lots, 
but the rate of increase during the period after the UGB was 
implemented was much lower compared to the period before the UGB 
was implemented. 
Finally, it has been demonstrated that proximity to the UGB 
was seen as an amenity and that housing prices do decline as they get 
away farther from the UGB. 
------· -· ··--------··. 
---·---------------
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In light of the empirical analysis described in the previous 
chapter on the relationship between UGBs and housing prices, this 
chapter will attempt first to summarize the major findings of the 
research, then to discuss research limitations, and the generalizability 
of the study, and finally, it will end with policy implications and 
recommendations for further research. 
MAJOR FINDINGS 
This study examined and analyzed the hypotheses raised in this 
research and showed the different results obtained as each hypothesis 
was analyzed. The following discussion summarizes the results of 
each hypothesis separately. 
UGBs and Rate of Increase in Housing Prices 
The major variable in the first regression model was the UGB 
variable, which allowed the measurement of the effect of the UGB 
after it was implemented. The analysis showed a negative coefficient 
which meant houses sold after UGB implementation were lower in 
price, however, the analysis went further and utilized three different 
regressions. One tested the full period before and after the UGB, 
another tested before the UGB, and the thir_Q_QJWJesred after the UGB. 
Comparing the results of the three regressions, it was 
demonstrated that the lot size coefficient had lower values after UGB 
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implementation which implied that there was no relationship 
between the UGB and the rate of increase in housing prices. 
Nevertheless, the same re-:;ults showed the same rel<).tionship between 
the amount of the interior footage of a house and the UGB. Tl~e rate 
of increase of the square footage of interior space of a house di:opped 
from 1.32 percent to 0.47 percentage when comparing periods before 
and after the UGB. 
The rate of increase in housing prices due to LOTSIZE dropped 
significantly form 0.20 percent to 0.02 percent from the period before 
the UGB was implemented to the period after. There could be other 
forces behind this drop rather than the UGB itself. 
It could be that the combination of the recef,jsion that hit the 
Portland housing market in the early 1980s, the dis~ppearance iof the 
fear of having a stringent UGB that preceded UGB implementation, 
and the association of the implementation of the i11 1981, that' could 
have contributed to the drop in housing prices, a~1d not the 1 UGB. 
Still, based on the results of the analysis, this study w,as not able l:o find 
any relation between the rate of increase in singl1~-family housing 
prices and the UGB. 
Rate of Increase in Housing Prices in the Latter Perio~ls 
The period after UGB implementation was qivided intd four 
periods and hence four regression models were utili~ed. The sum of 
the two main components for a real implicit price trend in a house 
value gradually increased during each period. Hpwever, lot size, 
which is directly related to the UGB, showed different magnitudes. 
Lot size captured 0.09 percent per _!:llontl~_g_L_!"tousi!:J.g value between 
1980-1982, and this percentage became -0.04 during the period of' 1983-
1985, while it went up again to +0.04 during 1986-1987, but dropped 
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down again to positive +0.03 percent during 1988-1990. The negative 
value during the period 1983-1985 could be attributed to the recession 
which occurred during thi.s period. 
These magnitudes do not comply with the hypothesis that 
states that the rate of increase during the latter periods are more rapid 
after the UGB was implemented. In fact, the rate of increase kept 
going down between the first and the fourth periods. Furthermore, 
with the exclusion of the period of the recession, the rate of increase in 
housing prices during the period before the UGB was implemented 
was much higher than any single period after the UGB was 
implemented. For example, during the period between 1986-1987 
when the economy was much better than the period before, the rate of 
increase was 0.04 percent versus 0.20 percent during the period before 
the UGB was implemented. In particular, the rate of increase during 
the period before the UGB was implemented was as much as five 
times the highest rate after the UGB was implemented. 
Consequently, this research was not able to prove the 
hypothesis that states that the rate of increase in housing prices is 
more rapid towards the latter periods. 
Rate of Price Increases of Single-Family Houses on Larger Lots 
The analysis showed some interesting results with respect to lot 
size. When the results of the data obtained from the three regression 
models, before/after, before, and after the UGB were compared, the lot 
amount variable was significant in the three regressions. Although 
the period after the UGB showed some increase in housing prices due 
to lot amount, the r<!te of .in.ne_gse_ciuring thE'~.p.eriod_after the UGB was 
implemented was 0.09 percent versus 0.71 percent before the UGB was 
implemented (almost 8 times less). 
--------------··· ---------------
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However, to understand better the relationship between the 
rate of increase in single family housing prices due to lot amount and 
the UGB, the post perioci was tested using four regression models. 
The results showed that there was not a significant increase due to lot 
amount during the first period, 1980-1982, while during the following 
three periods the coefficients of the lot amount variable showed a 
significant increase in their values. In fact, the increase went up as 
time proceeded. In particular, a house built on a large lot (12,800 feet 
or larger) captured $58 per month during 1983-1985, $66 during 1986-
1987, and $75 during 1988-1990. When the rate of increase was 
compared, the real implicit price of the lot amount during the last 
period, 1988-1990, showed a drop compared to the prior period. The 
rate of increase went down from 0.088 to 0.083 percent. On the other 
hand, when comparing the rate of increase during the four periods 
(after the UGB was implemented) with the rate of increase during the 
period before the UGB was implemented, it is obvious that the rate of 
increase during the period before the UGB was implemented was 
much higher (0.71 percent) than any of the four periods (0.025, 0.079, 
0.088, 0.083 percent, respectively) after the UGB was implemented. 
With the model and specification used to arrive at these results, this 
research was not able to find a relationship between the UGB and a 
higher rate of increase in housing prices due to lot amount. 
Proximity to UGBs as an Amenity 
The overall analysis showed that a house would gain some 
value as it gets closer to the UGB. Although both regression results, 
before and after the UGB, showed _<:I_Dgg.<ltiyg__c_oefficient for the DUGB 
variable, the post analysis showed a higher coefficient value. This 
means that people do value proximity to the UGB and as time passes 
- - ------~-~------ --- - -~-~~--------
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this proximity becomes more appreciated as development, including 
facilities and economic activities, gets closer to those houses that are 
located by the UGB. 
Nevertheless, comparing and analyzing the four periods after 
UGB implementation showed that the coefficients of the DUGB 
during the last two periods are significant and that a house would gain 
$0.82 per foot during 1986-1987 as it gets closer to the UGB, and $0.68 
during 1988-1990. Although the rate of increase in housing prices due 
to DUGB went down during the last period compared to the period 
before, it is still the case that the rate of increase is higher than before 
the UGB was implemented. These results support the hypothesis that 
states that distance to UGB influences housing prices. 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
This study attempted to overcome some of the shortcomings of 
other research that analyzes housing prices and growth controls. To 
investigate the relationship between housing prices and UGBs, a time-
series analysis was used instead of the commonly used and frequently 
criticized cross-sectional method. 
Using a time-series analysis limited the choices of variables, in 
particular the economic variables. Some researchers (Beaton 1982; 
Segal and Srinivasan 1985; Fischel 1991; and Black and Hoben 1985) 
argue that income and population are a very important measure of 
housing market in the region. However, this research excluded those 
variables due to the high multicollinearity and autocorrelation with 
other variables such as the time ingex_. ----------· 
Also, it is frequently documented in the housing market 
literature that school quality is an important factor in choosing a 
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house. This study attempted to find some data regarding school 
quality but there was none available. In fact, this research showed that 
proximity to elementary ~chools is positively correlated with housing 
prices, which means a house would lose some of its value as it gets 
closer to an elementary school. However, if the school quality data 
were available it would be possible to investigate whether proximity 
to an elementary school has an association with school quality or not. 
Although the crime rate variable was included in all the 
regression equations <~.nd found to be significant in most of the results, 
crime rate was measured on the county level rather than the 
neighborhood level. It was difficult to locate the neighborhood of 
each house because many sales fell within the unincorporated areas of 
Washington County. 
In the first regression, the UGB variable, the main variable in 
the model, showed a negative sign which is opposite of the expected 
one. This was attributed to the recession that took place in early 1980s. 
However, if the unemployment rate had been included as a variable 
in the regression model, the direction of the UGB's coefficient 
probably would have changed. 
Further, the association of another developmental policy, the 
Metropolitan Housing Rule MHR, which was implemented in 1981, 
made it difficult for this research to isolate the individual effect of 
each policy. 
Finally, the difficu!ty of obtaining data before 1978 made it very 
difficult to isolate the complete effect of the UGB before it was drafted 
in 1977. 
------------------· 
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GENERALIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This research used Washington County, Oregon, as a case study. 
However, it should be noted that Oregon is unique. On the one hand, 
Oregon is one of the early pioneers of UGBs in the nation, while on 
the other hand, its economics fluctuate and are less stable and more 
sensitive to national economic trends than other states due to its 
dependence on natural-resource industries. Oregon's economy was 
hit hard by the recession in the nation's economy. 
Therefore, due to these varying economic conditions, it is 
difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the generalizability of 
this study's results to other regions. 
POLICY IMPLICATION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Previous research, such as that by Knaap (1982, 1985) and 
Nelson (1984, 1986) has focused on the relationship between UGBs and 
land values, but the relationship between UGBs and housing prices 
has never been examined using empirical analysis. However, the 
relationship between UGBs and housing prices and the desire of state 
and local governments to ascertain this relationship will continue to 
be an important topic for researchers and policy makers. 
The findings of this research did not support the first four 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between the UGB and the rate 
of increase in housing prices. In fact, these findings are in line with 
Toulan's 1994 argument about th~Jand __ !!!_Cl.Xk.~t tbat "the Portland 
UGB does not seem to have created any imbalances in the land 
market" (p. 114). Based on these findings, it could be argued that 
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UGBs are positive in that they preserve farm land and stop sprawl 
without the negative consequences of raising housing prices. 
However, more co111plex models, better specification, and more 
data could show different results. In addition, it should be noted that 
this research tests only up to 1990, which is the midpoint of the 
designated period for the UGB. At this point there was an ample 
amount of raw land within the UGB and that is why the UGB did not 
show any relation to the rate of increase in housing prices. Thus 
policy makers are encouraged to study the same relationship for the 
period between 1990-1996. 
Nevertheless, even if it is found that there is a relationship 
between the UGB and rate of increase in housing prices, it is more 
rational for policy makers to weigh the cost and benefits of the UGB 
before altering the existing UGB. In particular, the UGB was 
implemented to serve the public interest and to accomplish several 
positive things, such as preserving rural land, shortening commutes, 
and stopping urban sprawl, which benefit the public at large. On the 
other hand, the UGB may be found to increase the individual cost in 
obtaining a house. So, the benefits to the public and the costs to the 
individual should be weighed. In short, policy makers should look at 
a larger picture than just costs. 
For future research, this study recommends the following: 
1. This research focused only on single-family dwellings; 
therefore, it is recommended that future research analyze the 
relationship between UGBs and prices of other types of housing 
dwellings. 
2. This research studied o~!y~p_!g __ '!290,~hen there was an 
ample amount of land within the UGB. It is recommended that 
100 
future research take this further and test the relationship between the 
UGB and hot1sing prices between 1991 and 1996. 
3. After 1990 sorhE: major policies were enacted such as Measure 
5 and the Trqffic Impact Fee. The implementation of these policies in 
conjunction with the. UGB requires future research using more 
complex models to control for the effect of each intervening policy. 
4. Market pressures due to the UGB may not be uniform in an 
urban area; therefore it is recommended that future research take into 
consideration this effect. 
5. Thip research recommends that future research examines the 
real effects o( the MHR because of the association with the UGB and 
because it is ~iifficult, with the available data, to ascertain whether the 
MHR has a negative or positive effect on the single-family housing 
market withput analyzing the price trends of a particular type of 
dwelling. 
In 1981., in addition to Goal 10, the Portland region adopted the 
Metropolitan Housing 1Rule MHR. "Its stated purpose is to assure 
opportunity for the provision of adequate numbers of needed housing 
units and th€! efficient tllse of land within the Metropolitan Portland 
(Metro) urban growth boundary, to provide greater certainty in the 
development process and so to reduce housing costs" (Toulan 1994, p. 
105). 
The MfiR, for example, required that at least 50 percent of new 
residential units be atta<thed single-family housing or multiple-family 
housing. K~tcham and Siegel (1991) believe that the MHR is an 
effective tool and as a result, 82 percent of all vacant land within the 
Portland metmpolitan region was zoned as single-family residential in 
1978 with an average lot size of 12,800 square feet. In 1989, which is 
eight years after the MHR was adopted, the average lot size had 
. ----------- -----------
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decreased to 8,800 square feet. and 54 percent of all vacant land was 
now zoned for multiple-family development. Although Toulan 
(1994) agrees with Ketchai11 and Siegel (1991) that the MHR has been a 
very effective tool, he argues that what cannot be easily verified is the 
extent to which housing affordability has been enhanced by the 
enactment of the MHR. 
In fact, an analysis could show that the MHR caused single-
family housing prices to go up because it reduced the percentage of 
availability of single-family houses while many people were looking 
to live in single-family houses even while other types were available. 
This is what happened, as discussed in Chapter II, in Boulder, 
Colorado. 
On the other hand, another study could find that the MHR 
caused single-family housing prices to decrease because perhaps 
people who wanted to live in single-family houses would be perfectly 
content living in apartments or condominiums as they see more of 
their neighbors doing so, and in turn this will shift the demand from 
single-family to multi-family housing and consequently lower prices 
in the single-family housing market. However, it is not clear that 
forcing people to live in less than a single-family house would create a 
net social benefit. It is conceivable that it would have the same sort of 
effect as the Boulder program and that some people would actually 
move outside the Portland region and endure long commutes in 
order to live in single-family houses. Only time and a good deal of 
additional research will tell. 
6. Many planners argue that the real constraint on land is the 
availability of the utilities and s~rvicel'_nt_lb_~r__iha_n the line of the 
UGB. Therefore, it is recommended that future research test for the 
relationship between the UGB and housing prices while taking into 
- -~ --- -----~~-------------
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consideration the amount of land that is developable. The argument 
states that housing prices are correlated with the availability of 
developable land rather than with raw land. 
7. Some scholars argue that the effect of the UGB goes back to 
its drafting rather than its implementation (the UGB was 
implemented in 1980 but was drafted in 1977). However this research 
was not able to find data before 1978. Future research should take this 
issue into consideration, especially for testing the effect of the UGB on 
other counties. Realtor Multiple Listing Service (RMLS) is an 
alternative source for data although it is not as comprehensive as the 
data from the Department of Assessment and Taxation. RMLS 
accounts only for those houses sold through real estate agents and 
does not include those houses sold by owners. 
------· -· ··--------·· 
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